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GOOD-FAITH PARTICIPATION IN COURT-CONNECTED
MEDIATION PROGRAMS
John Lande*
This Article discusses what can be done to promote productive behavior in
mediation and reduce bad conduct. Although most participants do not abuse the
mediation process, some people use mediation to drag out litigation, gain lever-
age for later negotiations, and generally wear down the opposition. Rules re-
quiring good-faith participation are likely to be ineffective and possibly
counterproductive. This Article proposes using dispute system design principles
to develop policies satisfying the interests of stakeholders in court-connected me-
diation programs. After outlining important interests of key stakeholder groups,
including litigants, attorneys, courts, and mediators, the Article describes spe-
cific policies that could satisfy their interests. These policies include collabora-
tive education about good mediation practice, pre-mediation consultations and
submission of documents, a limited and specific attendance requirement, and
protections against misrepresentation. If faithfully implemented, these policies
will enhance the integrity of mediation programs and satisfy the interests of the
stakeholder groups without the problems caused by good-faith requirements.
INTRO DUCTION .............................................................. 70
I. GOOD FAITH IN MEDIATION ............................................... 77
A. The Definition of Good Faith and the Rationale
for a Good-Faith Requirement ....................................... 77
B. Current Status of Good-Faith Requirements ........................... 78
C. Problems with Good-Faith Requirements .............................. 86
1. Problems Defining and Proving Good Faith ........................ 86
2. Overbreadth of Bad-Faith Concept ................................ 93
3. Inclusion of Settlement-Authority Requirement .................... 94
4. Questionable Deterrent Effect and Potential Abuse
of Bad-Faith Sanctions .......................................... 98
* Associate Professor and Director, LL.M. Program in Dispute Resolution, University of
Missouri-Columbia School of Law. J.D., Hastings College of Law; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-
Madison. Sincere thanks to Bob Ackerman, Mary Carnahan, Roger Carter, Michelle Cecil, Jim
Coben, Jonathan Cohen, Sarah Cole, Cathy Costantino, Martha Dragich, Chris Guthrie, Bill
Henning, Chris Honeyman, Ron Kelly, Kim Kovach, Lela Love, Bobbi McAdoo, Julie Macfarlane,
Ellen Miller, Jackie Nolan-Haley, Kelly Olson, Sharon Press, Len Riskin, Jeff Stempel, Jean Ster-
nlight, Nancy Welsh, Maureen Weston, Roselle Wissler, and Andria Zylstra for their helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts. I appreciate all the suggestions even though I could not use them all.
Thanks to Hong Hu, Clivia Pierre, and Pingping Zhang, Missouri LL.M. students, for research
assistance.
HeinOnline  -- 50 UCLA L. Rev. 69 2002-2003
70 50 UCLA LAw REVIEW 69 (2002)
5. Weakened Confidentiality of Mediation Communications .......... 102
6. Encouragement of Inappropriate Mediator Conduct ................ 106
II. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE QUALITY OF PARTICIPATION
IN LOCAL MEDIATION PROGRAMS ....................................... 108
A. Use of Dispute Systems Design Principles in Developing Local
M ediation Program Policies ......................................... 109
1. Appropriateness of Local Decisionmaking About Court-
Connected Mediation Programs ................................. 109
2. Applying Dispute Systems Design Techniques
in C ourt Settings .............................................. 112
B. Addressing Interests of Mediation Programs' Stakeholders .............. 118
1. Parties' Interests ............................................... 118
2. A ttorneys' Interests ............................................ 120
3. C ourts' Interests ............................................... 123
4. M ediators' Interests ............................................ 125
C. Policy Options to Address Stakeholders' Interests
and Promote Good Faith in Mediation ............................... 126
1. Collaborative Education About Good Practice
in M ediation .................................................. 127
2. Pre-Mediation Submission of Documents
and C onsultations .............................................. 129
3. Requirement of Mere Attendance for a Limited
and Specified Tim e ............................................ 132
4. Policy Governing Cancellation of Mediation ...................... 135
5. Protections Against M isrepresentation ............................ 137
C ONCLUSION ............................................................... 139
INTRODUCTION
What can be done to prevent people from behaving badly in media-
tion?1 One litigator described his approach to mediation this way:
"[If. .. I act for the Big Bad Wolf against Little Red Riding Hood
and I don't want this dispute resolved, I want to tie it up as long as I
possibly can, and mandatory mediation is custom made. I can waste
more time, I can string it along, I can make sure this thing never gets
resolved because ...I know the language. I know how to make it
1. In general, mediation is a procedure in which the mediator helps disputing parties nego-
tiate an agreement and in which the mediator has little or no authority to impose a decision if the
parties do not reach agreement. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTI-
CAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 8, 41-53 (2d ed. 1996). But see generally ROBERT A.
BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT
THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994) (arguing that, rather than settlement of dis-
putes, primary goals of mediation should be empowerment of individuals to manage conflict and
recognition of the concerns of others involved in conflict). Mediation is based on values that
parties should voluntarily make decisions in mediation ("self-determination"), mediators should
impartially help all parties in a dispute, and mediators should maintain the confidentiality of com-
munications in mediation. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ET AL., MODEL STAN.
DARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS §§l-II, V (1994), available at http://ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/
model standards of conduct for m.htm.
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look like I'm heading in that direction. I make it look like I can
make all the right noises in the world, like this is the most wonderful
thing to be involved in when I have no intention of ever resolving
this. I have the intention of making this the most expensive, longest
process but is it going to feel good. It's going to feel so nice, we're
going to be here and we're going to talk the talk but we're not going
to walk the walk."
2
In her study of Ontario litigators, Professor Julie Macfarlane found that
rather than using mediation to try to reach a settlement in good faith, some
lawyers use mediation to make misleading statements, "'smoke the other side
out,' gain leverage for later negotiations, drag out litigation, increase oppo-
nents' costs, and generally wear down the opposition.3 Bad-faith tactics in-
clude purposely wasting time and money to demoralize parties less able to
afford litigation.4 Attorneys can do this while using mediation jargon and
creating phony issues to appear sincerely interested in settling the case.5
These tactics certainly do not represent the approach of all or even most of
2. Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? Commercial Litigators and the Ontario Mandatory Medi-
ation Program, 2002 J. Disi. RESOL. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 32) (quoting a Toronto
litigator) (first alteration in original). Macfarlane interviewed the attorney in a study based on
interviews of forty litigators who had participated in at least ten mediations. Some lawyers and
litigants in the United States also take an adversarial approach to alternative dispute resolution
(ADR). See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innova-
tion Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1991) (expressing concern that
ADR has become "just another stop in the 'litigation' game which provides an opportunity for the
manipulation of rules, time, information, and ultimately, money").
3. Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at 31-32) (quoting an Ontario litigator). The
Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations of the ABA Section of Litigation would prohibit
attorneys from using the settlement process in bad faith. Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotia-
tions, 2002 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., § 4.3.1, at 49, at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ethics/settle-
mennegotiations.pdf. The Committee Note states:
[Ilt may be impermissibly deceptive, and thus an act of bad faith, for a lawyer to obtain
participation in settlement discussions or mediation or other alternative dispute resolution
processes by representing that the client is genuinely interested in pursuing a settlement,
when the client actually has no interest in settling the case and is interested in employing
settlement discussions or alternative dispute resolution processes solely as a means of delay-
ing proceedings or securing discovery.
Id.
4. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or Re-
quired? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 575, 591-96 (1997) (describing problems caused by bad-
faith conduct); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling
the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591,
607-08 (2001) (arguing that sanctions are needed "to compensate the aggrieved party for the costs,
fees, time, and anguish"); Roger L. Carter, Oh Ye of Little [Good] Faith: Questions, Concerns and
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. (forthcom-
ing 2002) (draft at 1-2, 48 n.191, 51 n.197) (describing cases in which parties take off time from
work and travel great distances for mediations that are unproductive because key participants fail to
attend or to make reasonable offers).
5. Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at 31). Although these tactics were not typical of
most of the litigators interviewed, Macfarlane found that some litigators used court-connected me-
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the Ontario litigators in the study, but rather they seem to vary based on the
local legal culture.6 For example, the adversarial tactics apparently were
concentrated especially in Toronto where the local legal culture is less sup-
portive of mandatory mediation than in Ottawa.7
Legislatures and courts have adopted rules requiring good faith in medi-
ation, and courts have sanctioned violators. 8 These requirements are pre-
diation as an instrument to gain partisan advantage. Id. Macfarlane's study focused only on attor-
neys; presumably some parties also act in bad faith in mediation.
In a survey of attorneys who participated in mediation in the Early Assessment Program of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, 18 percent said that some parties did not
participate in good faith in a mediation session. Almost two-thirds (63 percent) of the attorneys
indicated that they had not experienced bad faith by a party in a mediation. DONNA STIENSTRA ET
AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION & CASE
MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, at 242-44 (1997), available at http://156.132.47.230:11301/
verity/unpublished/0024.pdf.
6. Practitioners and scholars have long known of substantial variations in local legal cul-
tures. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 146-48 (1974) (collecting findings of local legal culture); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Pro-
fessionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1927 n.266 (1997) (collecting findings of local legal culture).
Recent studies suggest that there are variations in local "mediation culture" as well. John Lande,
Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 1, 69-70 (1998) [hereinafter Failing Faith]; Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at passim);
see also John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 839, 845-54 (1997) [hereinafter Lawyering and Mediation Transformation].
7. Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at passim). Macfarlane's study involved a non-
random sample that cannot provide a valid indication of the distribution of attitudes of Toronto
and Ottawa commercial litigators but are suggestive about local differences. Local legal culture is
only one factor affecting adversarial behavior, which is not is limited to or typical of all Toronto
litigators. Id.
8. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text for discussion of the definition of good
faith. Some commentators have proposed establishing good-faith requirements to ensure good con-
duct in mediation. For the two main proposals for a good-faith requirement, see generally Kovach,
supra note 4; Weston, supra note 4. Other commentators have expressed support for good-faith
requirements. See Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35
Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 337 (2001)(proposing "good faith obligation to meet and attempt mediation" in EEOC cases); Alan Kirtley,
The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege
Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1,
49-50 (favoring a good-faith requirement for mandatory mediation but not voluntary mediation);
Tony Biller, Comment, Good Faith Mediation: Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North
Carolina's Pre-Trial Process, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 281, 297-301 (1996) (arguing that carefully
designed good-faith standards would "improve efficiency, reduce cost and increase public satisfac-
tion with the civil court process"); Kathleen A. Devine, Note, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Poli-
cies, Participation, and Proposals, 11 REV. LITIG. 83, 108-09 (1991) (arguing that courts should
imply good-faith requirements if statutes do not provide for them); Charles J. McPheeters, Note,
Leading Horses to Water: May Courts Which Have the Power to Order Attendance at Mediation Also
Require Good-Faith Negotiation?, 1992 J. Disp. RESOL. 377, 393 (arguing that good-faith require-
ments are appropriate means for efficient use of alternative dispute resolution and courts); Matthew
A. Tenerowicz, Note & Comment, "Case Dismissed"-or Is It? Sanctions for Failure to Participate in
Court-Mandated ADR, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 975, 998-1000 (1998) (favoring sanctions
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mised on assumptions that mediation participants9 would understand readily
what behavior is required and would respond appropriately. This Article
challenges these assumptions. 10
The debate over good-faith requirements is related to the growth of
court-ordered mediation." In recent decades, courts increasingly have or-
for bad faith in alternative dispute resolution). See also James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and
Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 63-66 (1991)
(presenting interviews of twenty Florida mediators and attorneys most of whom favored a good-
faith requirement, with a "healthy minority" opposing it).
9. In court-connected mediation, the parties and their attorneys typically are the partici-
pants in mediation (in addition to the mediator). In some cases, experts and others also may
participate.
10. Good-faith requirements have been criticized as being ill-conceived and producing unin-
tended, adverse effects. For the three principal critiques, see Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Con-
versation About the Current Status and the Future of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. DIsP.
RESOL. 11, 30-33; Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of
Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2089-94 (1993); Alexandria Zylstra, The
Road from Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory Good Faith Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled,
17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 69, 86-97 (2001); see also James J. Alfini & Catherine G.
McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV.
171, 205-06 (2001) (arguing that vigorous judicial enforcement of a good-faith requirement may
stimulate subtle forms of coercion that "threaten to erode the integrity of the mediation process");
Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Mediative Art: A Guide to
Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 970 (1997) (opposing a good-faith
requirement because it would require the mediator to function in an "inappropriate role" and risks
"proliferation of litigation"); David Hricik, Reflections of a Trial Lawyer on the Symposium: Dialogue
with the Devil in Me, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 745, 749-52 (1997) (arguing that a duty of good faith
including a duty of disclosure would result in satellite litigation, unhappy parties, and reduced use
of mediation); Lisa A. Lomax, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: Rule 9019 and Bank-
ruptcy Mediation Programs, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 81 (1994) (opposing sanctions for abuse of
mediation because of the risk of possible satellite litigation and threats to confidentiality, appear-
ance of mediators' neutrality, mediators' effectiveness, and the willingness of mediators to take
cases); Andreas Nelle, Making Mediation Mandatory: A Proposed Framework, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 287, 304-05 (1992) (expressing concern that a good-faith requirement would violate confi-
dentiality protections, cause settlement pressure, and undermine voluntariness of agreements); So-
ciety of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Dispute Resolution as It Relates to the Courts: Mandated
Participation and Settlement Coercion, 46 ARB. J. No. 1, at 38, 46 (1991) (recommending against a
good-faith requirement); Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 269, 296 n.100 (1999) (arguing that a good-faith requirement "may create more problems
than it solves"); David S. Winston, Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes: "You
Can Lead a Horse to Water .... ", 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 187, 197-98 (1996) (arguing that
good faith is "inherently ambiguous" and that a good-faith requirement would require courts to
investigate the mediation process and undermine efficiency); Caroline Harris Crowne, Note, The
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1768, 1803 (2001) (arguing that mandating good faith would make a "farce of the process"); Note,
Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1096-97 (1990) (arguing that good-faith requirements are too vague to pro-
vide sufficient guidance on what constitutes compliance).
11. These programs are referred to alternatively as court-connected, court-ordered, court-
mandated, and court-annexed mediation programs. Court-connected programs differ in regard to
whether they require litigants to mediate or merely offer mediation as an option for the litigants.
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dered cases to mediation to help parties settle cases without trial and relieve
pressure on court dockets. In general, participants have been satisfied with
court-connected mediation programs. 2 Predictably, however, some people
do not want to participate in mediation, at least not at the time and under
the circumstances ordered by the court. In the past decade, numerous re-
ported cases have adjudicated claims of bad faith in mediation. This may
reflect a growing reaction against mandated mediation, especially in areas
where the legal culture promotes heavy settlement pressure.' 3
The controversy over good-faith requirements is part of a larger debate
over the purpose and nature of court-connected mediation programs. This
debate focuses on competing program goals and ideas about what is needed
to ensure the programs' integrity. On one side of the debate, people view
mediation programs as mechanisms to dispose of a portion of court dockets.
Courts order parties to spend time and money for mediation and want to be
sure that the time and money are well-spent. Courts also want to ensure
that parties and attorneys comply with their orders and cooperate with the
courts' case management systems. 14 From this perspective, a good-faith re-
quirement seems to be the logical way to ensure the integrity of court-con-
nected mediation programs.
See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from
Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 641, 648 n.21 (2002) (describing a continuum
of voluntary and mandatory referrals to mediation). This Article refers to all these programs as
court-connected regardless of whether courts order parties to mediate.
Although good-faith requirements can create problems in private (that is, non-court-con-
nected) mediation, this Article focuses on such requirements in court-connected mediation pro-
grams. Good-faith requirements often are implemented to maintain the integrity of court-
connected mediation programs, see infra notes 289-291 and accompanying text, and most of the
reported court cases involve court-ordered mediation, see infra note 53 and accompanying text. In
addition, the dispute system design approach recommended in Part II of this Article is particularly
relevant in dealing with variations of local legal culture about court-connected mediation
programs.
In private mediations, one generally can assume that the parties or their attorneys consciously
choose to mediate after assessing the potential benefits and risks. Thus, each side assumes the risk
of the other's bad-faith negotiation. In private mediations it generally would not be the courts'
business to supervise the mediation, although if parties execute agreements to mediate requiring
good-faith participation, courts could enforce those agreements. Presumably, however, agreements
to mediate that are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code include an implied requirement of
good faith. See U.C.C. § 2-103 (2002) (" Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obli-
gation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."); Weston, supra note 4, at 644. In such
private mediations, the same problems could arise in enforcing the requirement as in court-ordered
mediation.
12. See Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective on a Comprehensive
Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 885, 887 n.7 (1998) (summarizing studies analyz-
ing litigant satisfaction with mediation); John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and
Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 176-79 (2000) (presenting data and
summarizing other studies on lawyers' satisfaction with mediation).
13. See infra text accompanying note 55.
14. For further analysis of courts' interests in mediation programs, see infra Part ll.B.3.
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On the other side of the debate, people focus on the integrity of the
mediation process, defined as an adherence to mediation practice norms.
Many mediators are especially concerned that people participate in media-
tion without coercion, take advantage of opportunities for open discussion
and problem-solving, and receive assurance that courts will honor confiden-
tiality protections. 5 From this perspective, good-faith requirements seem to
violate mediation norms and thus undermine the integrity of court-con-
nected mediation programs. Although this brief summary oversimplifies the
debate, it captures a real tension in the debates about the future of court-
connected mediation programs.' 6
This Article makes two major arguments. First, good-faith require-
ments are likely to be ineffective and counterproductive in ensuring the in-
tegrity of court-connected mediation programs. Second, other strategies are
likely to be more effective in achieving that goal. This Article proposes two
types of strategies. One type of strategy involves specific policies 7 that sat-
isfy stakeholders"" interests in court-connected mediation programs. 19 Al-
though various writers have criticized good-faith requirements,20 only two
commentators have offered alternative policy proposals, and their sugges-
tions have problems similar to those of a good-faith requirement. 2' Second,
15. For further analysis of mediators' interests in mediation programs, see infra Part II.B.4.
16. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 6 (describing the tension between "quantita-
tive-efficiency" and "qualitative-justice" goals).
17. This Article contemplates a range of potential policies to promote the quality and integ-
rity of court-connected mediation programs, which could include some combination of rules, pro-
cedures, educational efforts, and other initiatives. See John Lande, Mediation Paradigms and
Professional Identities, MEDIATION Q., June 1984, at 19, 44 (advocating a variety of types of proce-
dural policymaking including "formulating guidelines, allocating resources .... and providing ser-
vices, in addition to enforcing rules"). For critiques of a policy strategy of rules regulating behavior
in mediation, see Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches
to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1330-48 (1995); Nancy A.
Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price
of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 78-92 (2001). For similar arguments regarding
the difficulty in regulating behavior in litigation more generally, see Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's
Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEx. L. REV. 259, 282 (1995), which argues that
"incivility and litigational abuse [are] particularly difficult to regulate by legalistic means," and
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IowA L. REV. 1219, 1234-35 (1990),
which argues that it is unrealistic to prohibit all lying in negotiation. This Article assumes that no
dispute resolution policy will be completely effective and that the goal in policy analysis is to
develop and select the best possible policies under the circumstances.
18. "Stakeholders" refers to groups affected by court-connected mediation programs, includ-
ing litigants, attorneys, courts, and mediators. See infra Part Il.B.
19. Under some policies suggested in this Article, courts could regulate the same specific
conduct that courts have sanctioned under the good-faith rubric (such as submission of pre-media-
tion memoranda and attendance at mediation), see infra note 68 and accompanying text, without
the problems of a vague and overbroad good-faith requirement, see infra Parts I.C.1 and I.C.2.
20. See supra note 10.
21. See Sherman, supra note 10, at 2094-2111; Winston, supra note 10, at 201-05. In place
of a good-faith requirement, Edward Sherman proposes a "minimal meaningful participation" re-
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this Article proposes the use of dispute system design (DSD) principles to
develop policies for court-connected mediation programs. In a DSD process,
representatives of all the stakeholder groups in a local mediation program
would participate in developing policies. A DSD approach examines
whether recurring instances of bad faith are symptoms of underlying
problems and, if so, seeks to address those problems as well as the immediate
symptoms. Instead of merely focusing on eliminating problematic behav-
ior,22 a DSD process could also help tailor programs to satisfy stakeholders'
interests generally, reduce motivation for problematic behavior, and improve
other aspects of the programs. Thus, a DSD process could result in policies
not specifically designed to produce good-faith conduct but that may none-
theless promote such conduct if the policies increase participants' satisfac-
tion with mediation programs. This Article recommends that good-faith
requirements should be adopted only as a last resort, after a court uses a DSD
process, seriously tries other policy options, and finds that those options do
not resolve significant problems of bad faith in mediation.
The proposals offered in this Article are not a panacea for settling de-
bates over the goals of court-connected mediation programs or ensuring
their integrity. If faithfully implemented, however, they will make a sub-
stantial contribution toward enhancing the efficacy and integrity of these
programs.
Part I defines good faith and summarizes the rationale for a good-faith
requirement. It also surveys the use of good-faith requirements in statutes,
court rules, and decisional law, and describes problems with good-faith re-
quirements in those contexts. Part II justifies the use of local rulemaking for
court-connected mediation programs and recommends use of DSD tech-
niques in designing local mediation programs that address stakeholders' in-
terests. Part II also proposes policy options that promote productive
mediation behavior specifically and address stakeholders' interests more gen-
erally. These options include collaborative education about good mediation
practice, use of pre-mediation consultations and document submissions, a
narrow requirement of attendance for a limited and specified time, and pro-
quirement. Sherman, supra note 10, at 2096-97. For a critique of this proposal, see infra note 85.
Sherman and David Winston also favor a requirement of attendance at mediation by a person with
full settlement authority. Sherman, supra note 10, at 2103-12; Winston, supra note 10, at 201-02.
For a critique of that position, see infra notes 130-147 and accompanying text.
22. This Article sometimes uses the terms "inappropriate" or "problematic" to refer to the
types of behavior similar to what commentators describe as bad-faith conduct. See infra notes
25-26 and accompanying text. The terms "inappropriate" or "problematic" avoid usage of a legal
term of art and an implication that such conduct is legally sanctionable. Similarly, this Article
sometimes refers to behavior as "sincere," "appropriate," or "productive" instead of "in good faith."
All of these terms are subjective, imprecise, and dependent on the values and perceptions of the
observers. Part ll.C, infra, proposes policy options that use more objective terms.
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tections against misrepresentation. The Conclusion summarizes the argu-
ments in this Article and proposes strict limits on the use of good-faith
requirements.
I. GOOD FAITH IN MEDIATION
A. The Definition of Good Faith and the Rationale
for a Good-Faith Requirement
Although the concept of good faith is used in many areas of the law and
has become part of the legal vernacular, there is no clear definition of the
concept. In one case, the court stated:
"Good faith" is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical
meaning or statutory definition. It encompasses, among other things,
an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of a design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual's per-
sonal good faith is a concept of his own mind and inner spirit and,
therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations
alone.23
In the mediation context, statutes, rules, and cases do not provide a clear
definition of good faith.24 To remedy that problem, Professor Kimberlee Ko-
vach proposes a statute with an itemized list of behaviors that constitute
good-faith conduct in mediation.25 Professor Maureen Weston endorses Ko-
23. Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259-60 (Sup. Ct. 1954). After analyzing the
meaning of good faith in various contexts, Kimberlee Kovach suggests that "in the end, perhaps it
is like obscenity: you know it when you see it." Kovach, supra note 4, at 600 (citing Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Weston, supra note 4, at 626
n.176 (citing additional sources).
24. See, e.g., Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff d
270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001). This case provides more detail about the meaning of good faith than
most other authorities-discussing requirements such as pre-mediation memoranda and attendance
of parties with settlement authority-but nonetheless does not provide a clear definition or indica-
tions of the boundaries of good faith. Id. at 1061-64.
25. Under Kovach's proposed statute, good faith includes the following:
a. Compliance with the terms and provisions of [the state statute or other rule governing
mediation];
b. Compliance with any specific court order referring the matter to mediation;
c. Compliance with the terms and provisions of all standing orders of the court and any
local rules of the court;
d. Personal attendance at the mediation by all parties who are fully authorized to settle
the dispute, which shall not be construed to include anyone present by telephone;
e. Preparation for the mediation by the parties and their representatives, which includes
the exchange of any documents requested or as set forth in a rule, order, or request of
the mediator;
f. Participation in meaningful discussions with the mediator and all other participants
during the mediation;
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vach's definition and argues that good faith should be judged under a "total-
ity of the circumstances" standard.26
Proponents argue that a good-faith requirement is necessary because,
without the threat of sanctions for bad faith, some participants might use
mediation to take advantage of their opponents, 27 and others might merely
"go through the motions" of mediating.2 Although proponents recognize
that court enforcement of a good-faith requirement would involve an excep-
tion to the general rule providing confidentiality in mediation, they contend
that such an exception is necessary and can be limited to issues related to
alleged bad faith. 29 Thus, they argue, a good-faith requirement would not
undermine parties' faith in the confidentiality of their communications.30
B. Current Status of Good-Faith Requirements
Statutes, court rules, mediation referral orders, and the common law
establish good-faith requirements in mediation.31 At least twenty-two states
and the territory of Guam have such statutory requirements.32 At least
g. Compliance with all contractual terms regarding mediation which the parties may
have previously agreed to;
h. Following the rules set out by the mediator during the introductory phase of the pro-
cess;
i. Remaining at the mediation until the mediator determines that the process is at an
end or excuses the parties;
j. Engaging in direct communication and discussion between the parties to the dispute,
as facilitated by the mediator;
k. Making no affirmative misrepresentations or misleading statements to the other parties
or the mediator during the mediation; and
1. In pending lawsuits, refraining from filing any new motions until the conclusion of the
mediation; ...
"Good faith" does not require the parties to settle the dispute. The proposals made at media-
tion, monetary or otherwise, in and of themselves do not constitute the presence or absence of
good faith.
Kovach, supra note 4, at 622-23; see also id. at 612, 615; Weston, supra note 4, at 627, 630.
26. Weston, supra note 4, at 630. Kovach's proposal does not include a similar catchall
provision. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 622-23.
27. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 604.
28. Id. at 592; see also Weston, supra note 4, at 613-14.
29. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 602-03; Weston, supra note 4, at 633, 638, 639.
30. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 602-03; Weston, supra note 4, at 622, 645.
31. See generally Richard D. English, Annotation, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Sanctions for
Failure to Participate in Good Faith in, or Comply with Agreement Made in, Mediation, 43 A.L.R.5TH
545 (1996). In this Article, references to good-faith requirements refer to such requirements in
mediation except where otherwise specified.
32. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.010(a)(4)(D) (Michie 2001); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
116.01(G) (West 2001); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.7(e)(3), (f), (h)(2)(C) (West 2002); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10089.81 (West 2002); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311(3) (West 2001); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-112(g), 45a-715(m), 46a-13o(a) (West 2002); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-
1108(3), 5-1110(j)-(k) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.1058, 400.429, 400.629(2)(a)(3)(b),
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twenty-one federal district courts33 and seventeen state courts34 have local
627.745(1)(d), 627.745(1)(O, 627.7015(5) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-23.3(5), 36-70-
25.1(d)(2), 48.8-89(d)(3), 50-8-7.1(d)(5), -8-2(a)(18)(C), -8-31( 20)(e) (2001); 7 GUAM CODE
ANN. § 43105(c) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421J-10(b), 514A-94(b)(2) (Michie 2001);
IND. CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-23(3)(A) (West 2001); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 437(B) (West
2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1487(8), tit. 19-A, §§ 251(4), § 1804, tit. 38, § 347-
A(4)(E) (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115B.414(3)-(4), 583.26(5)(c)(1), 583.27 (West
2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.680(6) (Michie 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-116(b)(9)
(2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1824(3), 1825(D) (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 109.305(4), 419B.365(7), 421.628(6) (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.404(a), 102.0085(a)
(Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.9(7), -38(6)(b)(i), (7) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.184(4)(c), § 59.20.080(3) (West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 19-23-6(18) (2001). Some
statutes apparently encourage good-faith participation without establishing a legal duty or conse-
quences for bad faith. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255(g) (West 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.401(A)(4)(d) (Anderson 2001). This list does not include statutes relating to mediation of
labor disputes, which are quite distinct.
33. See S.D. ALA., Loc. R. 16.6; C.D. CAL. BANKR. CT. R. App. Ill § 7.8; C.D. CAL.
BANKR. CT. R. 7016-6(3); D.D.C. App. B; M.D. FLA. Loc. BANKR. R. 9019-2(d)(2); S.D. FLA.
ADMIN. R. 9019-2(C)(4); D. IDAHO ORDER 130(n); N.D. ILL. BANKR. CT. R. 1000 (Form); S.D.
IND. ALT. Disp. RESOL. R. 2.1; D. MISS., UNIF. Loc. R. 83.7(H); E.D. Mo. Loc. R. 16-6.02(B)(1),
16-6.05(A); D.N.J. R. App. Q(I); D.N.J. Loc. BANKR. R. 9019-2(d)(4); S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 83.12(j);
S.D. N.Y. Loc. BANKR. R. ORDER M-117(3.2), (5.1), M-143(3.2), (5.1); E.D.N.Y. Loc. BANKR. R.
ORDER 9019-1(e); N.D.N.Y. Loc. R. 83.11-5(3), (5); E.D.N.C. Loc. R. 32.07(f), 32.10; N.D.
OKLA. Loc. BANKR. R. 9070(j); D. OR. CIV. R. 16.4(f)(2)(C); D. OR. Loc. BANKR. R. 9019-
2(C)(2); E.D. PA. Loc. BANKR. R. 9019-3(k)(3); E.D. WASH. Loc. R. 16.2(b); W.D. WASH. CIV.
R. 39.1(c)(4)(D); N.D. W. VA. Loc. R. CIV. PROC. 5.01(d)-(e). This list does not include general
orders establishing good-faith requirements in some courts. See, e.g., Lomax, supra note 10, at 75
n.132 (1994) (citing orders of the bankruptcy courts of the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern
District of Virginia and Southern District of California).
34. ALASKA BAR R. 13(g); 16 ARIZ. ST. R. CIv. P. 72(d)(2); 17B ARIZ. ST. CIv. ApP. P.R.
30(j); 17B ARIZ. ST. JuV. CT. R.P.R. 87(A); CAL. R. CT. SPEC. R. 1180(h)(2)(A); SUPER. CT. R.,
BUTTE COUNTY (Calif.) 5.14(b), 9.3(c); SUPER. CT. R., CONTRA COSTA COUNTY (Calif.) PROB.
POL'Y MAN., R. 102(B); SUPER. CT. R., NEVADA COUNTY (Calif.) 5.04(B), (D); SUPER. CT. R.,
ORANGE COUNTY (Calif.) 703(C)(4); SUPER. CT. R., PLUMAS COUNTY (Calif.) 9.3(c); SUPER. CT.
R., SAN BENITO COUNTY (Calif.) 11.11(j); SUPER. CT. R., SAN DIEGO COUNTY (Calif.) 4.186;
SUPER. Cr. R., SANTA CRUZ COUNTY (Calif.) 7.1.10; SUPER. CT. R., SONOMA COUNTY (Calif.)
16.4(D); SUPER. CT. R., STANISLAUS COUNTY (Calif.) 3.26(A)(c); SUPER. CT. R., TUOLUMNE
COUNTY (Calif.) 4.04(d); SUPER. CT. R., YUBA COUNTY (Calif.) 5.5(1); DEL. CT. CH. R.
174.1(c)(1); R. CT. TAX DIV., SUPER. CT. R. 13(b); HAW. APP. CONFERENCE PROGRAM R. 6(a);
HAW. PROB. R., MED. R. FOR PROB., TRUST, GUARDIANSHIP PROP. 5; 11TH JUD. CIR. (Ill.) CT. R.
111; 11TH JUD. CIR. (Ill.) CT. R., App. D(3)(j); 17TH JUD. CIR. (I11.) CT. GEN. ORDER 3.09; 17TH
JUD. CIRCUIT (ILL.) COURT FAM. MED. PROGRAM R. 4(5)(b); 18TH JUD. CIR. (I11.) CT. R. 14.01;
18TH JUD. CIR. (I11.) CT. R. 15.18(I)(C)(3); 19TH JUD. CIR. (Ill.) CT. R. 20.00; 21ST JUD. CIR.
(Ill.) CT. R. 8.2(k); 21ST JUD. CIR. (ILL.) CT. R. 9.1(4)(a)(5)(ii); IND. R.P., ALT. DISP. RESOL. 2.1;
IOWA CODE ANN. STANDARDS PRACTICE MED. FAM. DISPUTES 11.2(4); 30TH JUD. CIR., JFFERSON
CIR. CT. (Ky.) R. PRAC., ALT. DISP. RESOL. 1401; 30TH JUD. CIR., JEFFERSON CIR. CT. (Ky.) R.
PRAC., App. C(5)(a); 15TH JUD. DIST. (La.) CT. R., App. 5; ME. FAM. CT. , ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER-UNIF. DOM. REL. MED. ORDER R. 3; MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. RULE 1:18, UNIF. R. DISP. RES.
9(i)(ii); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. ALT. DISP. RESOL. 170(h); N.J. R. CT. 1:40-4(e); MONTGOMERY
COUNTY (Ohio) Loc. R.P. 2.39(VII)(B); SUMMIT COUNTY (Ohio) C.P.R. 22.10; PA. R. CIV. P.
1940.2; BRADFORD COUNTY (Pa.) R. CIv. P. 1915.3-4; NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY (Pa.) Loc. R.
1915.1(B); BEAVER COUNTY (Pa.) Loc. R. CIv. P. 1915.26(2); CRAWFORD COUNTY (Pa.) Loc. R.
CIv. P. L1915.26E; GREENE COUNTY (Pa.) R.P. G1915(c); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 53.4(0(4);
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rules requiring good-faith participation. In addition, several courts have re-
lied on Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure35 as the basis of a
good-faith requirement.36 Only one of all these statutes and rules includes a
definition of good faith; that statute applies only to farmer-lender disputes.37
Many of these statutes and rules are transsubstantive3 8 Others apply to me-
diations in particular subject areas. 39
In some of these statutes and rules, the reference to good faith seems
incidental, as if the term is innocuous language with no particular conse-
quence. For example, more than a third of these statutes and rules include a
KLICKITAT & SKAMANIA COUNTY (Wash.) SUPER. CT. R. 7(V)(B); WALLA WALLA COUNTY
(Wash.) SUPER. CT. Loc. R. 20(A); WHATCOM COUNTY (Wash.) SUPER. CT. Loc. R. 94.08(f);
YAKIMA (Wash.) SUPER. CT. Loc. R. 94.04W(D)(1)(c). In addition, several court rules include
standards or guidelines encouraging good-faith participation but are not framed as mandatory re-
quirements. See GA. CT. R. & PROC., APP. C(A)(I); IND. CT. R. ALT. Disp. RESOL. GUIDELINE
8.7; KAN. SUPER. CT. R. 901 APP., KAN. STANDARDS PRACT. LAW. MED. FAM. Disp. I.E.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0. Under Rule 16, a federal district court can sanction individuals
who have not participated in good faith in pretrial conferences. See id.
36. Although the language of Rule 16 includes a good-faith requirement for pretrial confer-
ences and does not explicitly refer to mediations, several courts have relied on this rule in adjudi-
cating claims of bad faith in mediation. See, e.g., Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 594
(8th Cir. 2001); Raad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 4:CV97-3015, 1998 WL 272879, at *5 (D.
Neb. May 6, 1998); Seidel v. Bradberry, No. 3:94-CV-0147-G, 1998 WL 386161, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
July 7, 1998).
37. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27(1)(a) (West 2000).
38. The local court rules generally apply to all matters in the court's jurisdiction, with the
most notable exception of rules governing mediation of child custody and visitation issues.
39. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.010(a) (Michie 2001) (contracts between health care
providers and managed care entities); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.7(e), (0, (h) (West 2002) (pos-
tadoption contact agreements); CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.81 (West 2002) (earthquake insurance
claims); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-13o(a) (West 2002) (duty of child advocate to mediate in
good faith in all actions involving children prior to bringing suit); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1101, 5-
1108(3), 5-1110(j), (k) (2001) (citizen complaints against police); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 164.1041(1), 164.1058 (West 2001) (intergovernmental disputes); id. § 400.629(1)(2) (com-
plaints involving adult family-care homes); id. § 627.745(1)(d), (f) (motor vehicle insurance
claims); id. § 627.7015(1), (5) (property insurance claims); id. § 718.1255 (4)(g) (condominium
disputes); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-23.3(d)(5) (2001) (contracts addressing water pollution con-
trol); id. § 48-8-89(d)(3) (2001) (distribution of tax proceeds); id. § 50-8-7.1(d)(5) (duty of good-
faith mediation of all disputes by local government recipients of funding from state Department of
Community Affairs); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-26-2-23(3)(A) (West 2001) (riparian disputes related
to lake conservation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1487(8) (West 2001) (home construction
contract disputes); id. tit. 19-A, § 251(4) (domestic relations cases); id. tit. 19-A, § 1804 (grand-
parent visitation disputes); id. tit. 38, § 347-A(4)(E) (violation of environmental protection or-
ders); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.414(3), (4) (West 2001) (landfill cleanup cost allocations); id.
§§ 583.26(5), 583.27 (farmer-lender disputes); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.680(6) (Michie 2001) (con-
struction defects cases); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-116(b)(9) (2001) (special education disputes);
OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.365(7) (2001) (enforcement of guardianship orders); id. § 421.628(6)
(rates, terms and conditions of furnishing necessary public services to corrections facilities); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.20.080(3) (West 2001) (eviction of mobile home tenants); WASH. SUPER.
Cr. Civ. R. 53.4(0(4) (health care claims); W. VA. CODE § 19-23-6(18) (2001) (disputes between
racetrack licensees and horse owners and trainers).
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good-faith requirement without providing sanctions for noncompliance. 40
Thus, it is unclear if the drafters of those provisions intended to create a
litigable issue. 41 Most of the statutes and rules, however, do provide for
sanctions or other legal consequences, though many do not specify the sanc-
tions that may be imposed. 42 When sanctions are specified, they frequently
involve payment of fees and costs related to the mediation.43 Other sanc-
tions include holding individuals in contempt 44 and empowering the media-
tor to suspend or terminate the mediation. 45 Some sanctions affect the
procedural status of the case, such as referral to judicial arbitration,46 preclu-
sion of a court hearing, 47 and even dispositive action such as dismissal. 48 In
some instances, bad-faith participation may affect the merits of a case, for
example, by constituting a factor in child custody or visitation cases.49 Some
statutes provide for specialized sanctions related to the subject matter of the
statutes, such as employee discipline and loss of government funding.50
Most of the good-faith statutes and rules do not state whether media-
tion confidentiality protections would preclude admission of evidence of bad
faith or preclude mediators from testifying or making recommendations for
sanctions. A few statutes and rules do address these issues. 5'
40. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.7015(5) (West 2001). Although many statutes and
rules mandating good-faith participation do not explicitly provide for sanctions, some courts might
authorize sanctions under general procedural statutes, rules, or the courts' inherent authority. See
Nick, 270 F.3d at 594-95.
41. One court stated, in dictum, that it had no authority to assess costs and fees because the
good-faith rule did not explicitly provide for such sanctions against the state. See State v. Carter,
658 N.E.2d 618, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
42. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.010(a)(4) (Michie 2001).
43. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.414(3), (4) (West 2001). Under some statutes,
courts may decline to award attorney's fees that otherwise would be awarded. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 400.429 (West 2001).
44. See, e.g., N.D. OKLA. Loc. BANKR. R. 9070(j).
45. See, e.g., 17B ARIZ. ST. Civ. APP. P.R. 30(j). Conversely, some statutes authorize courts
to order parties to mediation after finding bad-faith participation. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19-A, § 1804 (West 2001).
46. SUPER. CT. R., STANISLAUS COUNTY (Calif.) 3.26(A) (referring case to mandatory judi-
cial arbitration if party fails to participate in good faith); SUPER. CT. R., SONOMA COUNTY (Calif.)
16.4(D) (restoring case to fast track if party is not participating in good faith); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38, § 347-A(4)(E) (West 2001) (barring removal of action to superior court until after
good-faith mediation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-116(b)(9) (2001) (refusing to grant continuance
if party mediates in bad faith).
47. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311(3) (West 2001).
48. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 251(4) (West 2001).
49. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-38(7) (2001).
50. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1110 (2001) (sanctions for police failing to participate in good
faith in police complaint review board mediation); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-8-7.1(d)(5) (2001) (inel-
igibility of local government agencies for state funding).
51. See, e.g., DEL. CT. CH. R. 174.1(c)(1) (mediator may make recommendations regarding
sanctions for bad-faith participation in mediation); E.D. Mo. R. 16-6.04(A) (creating exception to
confidentiality rule to permit mediators to file report indicating compliance with good-faith re-
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Most of the twenty-seven reported cases dealing with bad faith in medi-
ation 5 arise in court-connected mediation.53 The number of reported cases
increased in the 19 90s.54 The growth in the number of bad-faith cases may
be a function of courts' increasing reliance on court-ordered mediation and
an increasing legalization of mediation. 55 The increasing number of disputes
over good faith also may be an indicator of a backlash against court-ordered
mediation in some situations.
The behaviors alleged to constitute bad faith can be grouped into five
categories as shown in Table 1. One such allegation is simply that a party
has failed to attend.56 A second allegation involves the failure of an organi-
zational party to send a representative with sufficient settlement authority. 57
A third group of allegations involves activities in preparation for mediation,
including failure to produce a pre-mediation memorandum 58 or to bring ex-
perts to mediation.59 A fourth group of allegations involves the sufficiency
and sincerity of efforts to resolve the matter, including claims that a party
quirement); GA. CT. R. & P., App. C(A)(IV), commentary (confidentiality precludes mediatorfrom reporting bad faith); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.680(6) (Michie 2002) (mediator report of bad
faith is admissible in evidence). For discussion of confidentiality regarding bad-faith conduct, see
infra Part I.C.5.
52. This part analyzes cases in which the court adjudicated issues of bad faith in mediation.
Thus, it excludes cases in which the conduct has not been characterized as bad faith although the
same behavior has been called bad faith in other cases. See, e.g., Physicians Protective Trust Fund
v. Overman, 636 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (failure to send representative with
settlement authority was not decided based on good-faith requirement). This part also excludes
some cases involving labor negotiations in which good faith is distinguishable from court-con-
nected mediation. See infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text. For a review of selected cases
involving allegations of bad faith in mediation, see Alfini & McCabe, supra note 10, at 177-95.
53. In fifteen of these cases, it was clear from the opinions that the mediations were court-
connected. In most of the other cases, the mediations were probably court-connected, but there
was no indication of this in the opinions.
54. Only three cases were decided before 1990. There has been at least one new reported
case in every year since 1991 except for 1993. The pace has increased recently: There have been
eleven reported cases since 1998. Presumably there has been a somewhat parallel growth in the
number of unreported bad-faith cases.
55. See Lawyering and Mediation Transformation, supra note 6, at 845-47 (describing "liti-
mediation" legal environment).
56. See Seidel v. Bradberry, No. 3:94-CV-0147-G, 1998 WL 386161, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July7, 1998); Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
57. See Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cit. 2001); Raad v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. 4:CV47-3015, 1998 WL 272879, at *4-*8 (D. Neb. May 6, 1998); Francis v.Women's Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, 144 F.R.D. 646, 647-48 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Hill v.
Imperial Say., No. A-91-780, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185, at *73-*74 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 24,
1992); Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, 525 So. 2d 519, 519-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (An-
stead, J., dissenting); Stoehr v. Yost, 765 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); In re Acceptance
Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 451-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
58. See Nick, 270 F.3d at 596-97; Francis, 144 F.R.D. at 647.
59. See Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 645-46
(2001).
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has not made any offer or any suitable offer,60 has not participated substan-
tively and attempted to resolve the case, 61 has not provided requested docu-
ments,62 has made inconsistent legal arguments,63 or has unilaterally
withdrawn from mediation.64 Finally, a fifth group consists of miscellaneous
allegations such as failure to sign a mediated agreement, 65 failure to release
living expenses pending farmer-lender mediation,66 or engaging in unspeci-
fied bad-faith behavior.67
Table 1. Alleged Bad-Faith Behaviors and Ultimate Rulings
Ruling in Final Reported Opinion
Bad Faith Not Bad Faith
1 Failure to attend mediation Luxenberg
Seidel
2 Failure to send an organizational representative with Francis Acceptance
sufficient authority to settle the case Golasa Hill
Nick Stoehr
Raad
3 Failure to submit pre-mediation memorandum Francis
Nick
Failure to bring experts as ordered Foxgate*






Failure to participate substantively or to attempt to Pirtle*** Stoehr
resolve the case Graham*
Hansen*
Cart ter**
Failure to provide documentary evidence Guzman**
60. See Hunt v. Woods, Nos. 94-3748, 94-4179, 1996 WL 8037, at *3-*4 (6th Cir. Jan. 9,
1996); Hill, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185, at *69-*70, *73-*74; Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988,
989-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Stoehr, 765 N.E. 2d at 687-90; Obermoller v. Fed. Land Bank of
Saint Paul, 409 N.W.2d 229, 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Gray v. Eggert, 635 N.W.2d 667, 668-70
(Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
61. See Stoehr, 765 N.E.2d at 687-90; State v. Carter, 658 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995); Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397, 400-01 (Iowa 1989); Tex. Dep't of Transp. v.
Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d 657, 657-58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); Hansen v. Sullivan, 886 S.W.2d 467, 468
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
62. See Guzman v. Polisar, No. 99-2060, 2000 WL 1335534, at *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 15,
2000).
63. Obermoller, 409 N.W.2d at 231-32.
64. In re Bolden, 719 A.2d 1253, 1254-55 (D.C. 1998).
65. Rizk v. Millard, 810 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
66. Wieweck v. United States Dep't of Agric., 930 F.2d 619, 620-22 (8th Cir. 1991).
67. See United States v. Miller-Stauch Constr. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1209, 1211 (D. Kan.
1995); Plouffe v. Lake County Sheriffs Office, 653 So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Herbst v. Princeton Bank, No. C3-96-1903, 1997 WL 309441, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10,
1997); Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); Decker
v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
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Use of erroneous legal argument Obermoller**
Unilateral withdrawal from mediation Bolden
5 Failure to sign mediated agreement Rizk
Failure to release living expenses pending Wieweck
farmer-lender mediation





Note: This table includes cases in which courts adjudicated issues relating to bad faith, but in some instances, the
courts made rulings as a matter of law without addressing the facts of the particular cases. Some cases involved
allegations of more than one type of bad-faith behavior. For citations to the cases in this table, see nn.56-67.
*Decision based on lack of authority to sanction bad faith in mediation.
**Decision based on insufficient evidence rather than the nature of the allegation.
***Sanctioned party might have escaped sanction if it had objected to order reqluiring attendance at mediation.
The final court decisions in these cases generally have been quite con-
sistent in each category. The courts have found bad faith in all the cases in
which a party has failed to attend the mediation or has failed to provide a
required pre-mediation memorandum.68 In cases involving allegations that
organizational parties have provided representatives without sufficient settle-
ment authority, the courts have split almost evenly.69 In virtually all of the
other cases in which the courts ruled on the merits of the case, they rejected
claims of bad faith.?o In effect, the courts have interpreted good faith nar-
68. See supra notes 56-57.
69. Out of seven cases involving allegations of lack of settlement authority, the courts found
bad faith in four of these cases. See Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 596-97 (8th Cit.
2001); Raad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 4:CV97-3015, 1998 WL 272879, at *4-*8 (D. Neb.
May 6, 1998); Francis v. Women's Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 144 F.R.D. 646, 647
(W.D.N.Y. 1992); Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, 525 So. 2d 519, 519-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (Anstead, J., dissenting). The court found no bad faith in three of these cases. Hill v.
Imperial Say., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185, at *73-*74 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 1992); Stoehr v.
Yost, 765 N.E.2d 684, 686-90 (Ind. App. 2002); In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443,
451-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). For discussion of problems in mandating attendance of a representa-
tive with full settlement authority, see infra Part I.C.3.
70. See Table 1. Other than a case involving an idiosyncratic farmer-lender mediation stat-
ute, the court found bad faith in only one of these cases, Texas Department of Transportation v. Pirtle,
977 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), and that case seems wrongly decided. In that case, a
plaintiff sued the Texas Department of Transportation for injuries sustained as the driver in a one-
car accident. The Department refused to make an offer in mediation based on its policy of not
settling cases of disputed liability. Id. at 658. The trial court found that the Department mediated
in bad faith because it failed to file an objection to the order to mediate as authorized in the
statute. Although the Department won at trial, the trial court assessed the Department all costs of
court, including attorney's fees and mediator's fees. Remarkably, the appellate court affirmed this
decision. Id. This decision was unwise for several reasons. In many cases, parties unexpectedly
learn new information and change their perspectives in mediation; thus, it seems strange to penal-
ize a party for going to mediation rather than seeking to cancel it. This decision creates a perverse
incentive to cancel mediation defensively to avoid potential bad-faith claims. In a similar case, in
which the defendant won at trial but the trial court imposed sanctions because the defendant
attended mediation intending not to make a settlement offer, the appellate court reversed the
decision sanctioning the defendant. See Stoehr, 765 N.E.2d at 690. For discussion of policies for
cancellation of mediation, see infra Part II.C.4.
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rowly to require compliance with orders to attend mediation, provide pre-
mediation memoranda, and, in some cases, produce organizational represent-
atives with sufficient settlement authority.
This apparent clarity in the results masks a pattern in which appellate
courts frequently reversed lower court findings of bad faith. In eight of the
thirteen reported cases in which findings of bad faith were appealed, the
appellate court rejected the lower court's decision on this issue. 71
This pattern of reversals suggests that trial courts become frustrated
with one side's refusal to cooperate in mediation and that some trial courts
overreach their authority to sanction mediation behavior. By comparison,
only five cases were found in which a trial court's rejection of a bad-faith
claim was appealed. All those trial court rulings were upheld.72
In re Acceptance Insurance Co. 73 illustrates a trial court exceeding its
authority by investigating a bad-faith claim extensively. In that case, the
parties did not settle in mediation. The parties tried the case and the court
ruled for the plaintiff. Soon after the trial, the plaintiff filed a motion seek-
ing $250,000 in sanctions against the defendant's insurer for violating the
mediation order by failing to mediate in good faith. At the hearing on the
motion, and over strenuous objections by the insurer's attorney, the trial
court permitted detailed cross-examination of the insurance adjustor who
attended the mediation. The adjustor was asked about her knowledge of the
case, preparation for the mediation, communications with her supervisor by
telephone during the mediation, and authorization to settle the case to the
full policy limit. The trial court stated: "The Court will note that the adjus-
tor's knowledge as to the facts and potential damages of this case are [sic] so
71. The trial court decisions on bad faith were reversed in eight cases. See Guzman v.
Polisar, No. 99-2060, 2000 WL 1335534, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 15, 2000) (basing decision on
insufficiency of evidence); In re Bolden, 719 A.2d 1253, 1254-55 (D.C. 1998); State v. Carter, 658
N.E.2d 618, 621-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (basing decision on insufficiency of evidence); Stoehr,
765 N.E.2d at 686-90; Acceptance Ins., 33 S.W.3d at 452-54; Davis, 988 S.W.2d at 375; Rizk v.
Millard, 810 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Gray v. Eggert, 635 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2001). The appellate court upheld the bad-faith decisions in five cases. See Nick, 270
F.3d at 597; Wieweck, 930 F2d at 621-23; Golasa, 525 So. 2d at 519-20; Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d at 658;
Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
The thirteen cases mentioned in the text do not include the following cases in which appel-
late courts reversed lower court decisions finding an overbroad conception of what behavior consti-
tuted bad faith or reversed lower court decisions attempting to establish a duty of good-faith
participation in mediation. See Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr.
2d 642, 655-56 (2001); Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 989-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992);
Hansen v. Sullivan, 886 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 251-52.
72. See Hunt, 1996 WL 8037, at *3-*4; Plouffe, 653 So. 2d at 508 (finding a lack of author-
ity to sanction bad faith); Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397, 400-02 (Iowa 1989) (finding a lack
of authority under statute to determine bad faith); Herbst, 1997 WL 309441, at *1; Obermoller v.
Fed. Land Bank of Saint Paul, 409 N.W.2d 229, 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding an insuffi-
ciency of evidence).
73. 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
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woeful as to constitute a sham of following my order [to mediate]."4 The
trial court continued the hearing and ordered the personal appearance of a
senior vice president for the insurer. 7 The insurer obtained a writ from the
appellate court to prevent the trial court from holding further hearings or
imposing sanctions.76
The fact that the appellate courts reversed legally incorrect findings of
bad faith in the eight reported lower court cases might comfort some people
that the legal system works'properly, but litigants may feel some anguish
about the expense and uncertainty of appeal. 77 Moreover, the pattern of
reversals suggests that some courts may pressure parties to settle in mediation
in cases that are never appealed.
C. Problems with Good-Faith Requirements
1. Problems Defining and Proving Good Faith
The definition of good faith in mediation is one of the most controver-
sial issues about good-faith requirements. Legal authorities establishing
good-faith requirements and commentators' proposals do not give clear gui-
dance about what conduct is prohibited. As a result, mediation participants
may feel uncertain about what actions mediators and judges would consider
bad faith. This uncertainty could result in inappropriate bad-faith charges as
well as a chilling of legitimate mediation conduct.
In practice, the courts have limited their interpretation of good faith in
mediation to attendance, submission of pre-mediation memoranda, and, in
some cases, attendance of organizational representatives with adequate set-
tlement authority.78 Despite the narrow scope of courts' actual application
of good-faith requirements, 79 good-faith language in the legal authorities and
commentators' proposals go far beyond these specific matters.8 0
Commentators agree that the definition of good faith needs to be
clearly and objectively determinable so that everyone can know what con-
duct is considered bad faith-"' Commentators disagree, however, about
74. Id. at 447.
75. Id. at 446-47.
76. Id. at 454-55.
77. The time, expense, and uncertainty of appeal can be substantial and in most cases proba-
bly much greater than the costs involved in a mediation "wasted" due to bad faith.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. Policymakers could establish the three spe-
cific requirements mentioned in the text without the problems arising from establishing them as
part of a vague good-faith requirement.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
80. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
81. See Brazil, supra note 10, at 31; Kovach, supra note 4, at 601; Sherman, supra note 10, at
2093; Weston, supra note 4, at 628.
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whether the definition of good faith can be clear, objectively determinable,
and predictable, and whether good faith is a function of the reasonableness
of participants' offers or their state of mind.
Kovach argues that "without an explanation or definition of just what is
meant by the term good faith, each party may have in mind something dif-
ferent. It is important that the parties are clear about the term."82 She
maintains that "judg[ing] a party's state of mind is too complex and subjec-
tive" to be appropriate in determining good faith in mediation.83 She also
contends that bad faith does not include failure to make an offer or "come
down enough," stating that "[tihe economic aspects of the negotiations-the
offers and responses, in and of themselves-may not create a bad faith
claim."84
Most of the elements of good-faith definitions do not satisfy Kovach's
criteria. Virtually all good-faith elements depend on an assessment of a per-
son's state of mind, which is, by definition, subjective.85 Consider the fol-
lowing definition from Hunt v. Woods:86
82. Kovach, supra note 4, at 596; see also id. at 614-15; Weston, supra note 4, at 628.
83. Kovach, supra note 4, at 610.
84. Id. at 603.
85. See Brazil, supra note 10, at 31-32; Sherman, supra note 10, at 2093-94; Winston, supra
note 10, at 197-201; Note, supra note 10, at 1096-97.
Although Kovach writes that courts should not base a good-faith determination on a party's
state of mind, see Kovach, supra note 4, at 610, she also writes that "[glood faith includes coming to
the mediation with an open mind, not necessarily a promise to change a view, but a willingness to
be open to others." Id. at 615-16 (emphasis added). Similarly, she states, "[Glood faith simply
requires that the parties make a genuine push towards a solution." Id. at 611. Kovach's proposed
statute would require "participation in meaningful discussions." Id. at 622. How genuine and
meaningful the efforts are clearly seems to be a function of one's state of mind.
Perhaps Kovach intends that these factors be assessed from an external "objective" standard,
such as a reasonable person standard, rather than an internal "subjective" standard, such as a per-
son's actual intent. While the proposed good-faith indicators may be objectively determinable
from this perspective, they are highly arguable and thus unclear in practice.
Professor Edward Sherman criticizes the "inherent ambiguity" of the concept of good faith and
proposes instead a "minimal meaningful participation" requirement, which he argues avoids the
subjectivity of a good-faith requirement. Sherman, supra note 10, at 2093, 2096. Determining
whether participation is minimally meaningful has the same problems as interpreting a good-faith
standard. Bullock & Gallagher, supra note 10, at 981; Kovach, supra note 4, at 599; Weston, supra
note 4, at 622 n.156; Winston, supra note 10, at 198-99; Zylstra, supra note 10, at 98-99. Partici-
pants easily could be confused about what is prohibited because of the vagueness of both standards.
Observers can reasonably differ whether it would be meaningful participation if, for example, a
participant (1) says that she will listen to the other side but does not have any new information to
offer, (2) harshly attacks the other side's position and merely repeats arguments that she has previ-
ously made, or (3) makes an offer that is very different from what knowledgeable observers believe
would be a likely court judgment. To make fair conclusions about whether the conduct is "mean-
ingful," one would need to analyze carefully the history of the litigation and the merits of the case.
Although Sherman presumably intends the qualifier "minimal" to limit the scope of sanctionable
behavior, it introduces additional uncertainty about the level of participation required.
86. Nos. 94-3748, 94-4197, 1996 WL 8037 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 1996).
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A party has not "failed to make a good faith effort to settle" under
[the statute] if he has (1) fully cooperated in discovery proceedings,
(2) rationally evaluated his risks and potential liability, (3) not at-
tempted to unnecessarily delay any of the proceedings, and (4) made
a good faith monetary settlement offer or responded in good faith to
an offer from the other party. If a party has a good faith, objectively
reasonable belief that he has no liability, he need not make a mone-
tary settlement offer. 87
Good faith under this definition is not objectively determinable, readily
predictable, or independent of parties' states of mind or their bargaining po-
sitions. To assess their risk evaluations, courts must determine the merits of
the case, whether parties' evaluations are objectively reasonable, and
whether their negotiation strategies are deemed acceptable by the courts.
Courts make these assessments at subsequent hearings in which there is a
great temptation to take advantage of hindsight. Obviously parties' under-
standings of the law and the facts evolve during the course of litigation so
that some things do not become clear for a period of time, perhaps not until
trial or even later."" To make fair decisions, courts would need to recon-
struct the information available to the parties at the time of the mediation.
Courts also would need to consider the negotiation history up to the point of
the alleged bad faith. Given the norms of negotiation in litigated cases,
parties rarely begin negotiations by offering the amount that they believe
''the case is worth." The timing and amount of offers often depend on the
context of prior offers and the conduct of the litigation more generally. Par-
ties vary in negotiation philosophy; some prefer to negotiate early and make
apparently reasonable offers whereas others prefer to engage in hard bargain-
ing, taking extreme positions and deferring concessions as long as possible s 9
87. Id. at *3 (quoting Kalain v. Smith, 495 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ohio 1986)). Cf. BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 701 (7th ed. 1999) (defining good faith as a "state of mind consisting in (1)
honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasona-
ble commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to
defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage"). Kovach's and Weston's definitions of good faith
include many similar elements. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 614-16, 622-23; Weston, supra note
4, at 626-27, 630.
The Hunt v. Woods definition of good faith assumes that people should make settlement deci-
sions based solely on rational assessments of probable court outcomes. In practice, people often
make such decisions based on additional factors, including their expectations about others' conduct
leading up to the dispute and in the dispute process, perceptions of the underlying values repre-
sented in the dispute, and experience of the fairness of their treatment. See generally Julie Macfar-
lane, Why Do People Settle?, 46 McGILL L.J. 663 (2001). Parties should be entitled to make
settlement decisions based on factors in addition to predictions of court outcomes.
88. If the issues always were clear, there would be less litigation and less disagreement among
judges about the appropriate results. Indeed, parties often contest cases precisely because they
differ sincerely in their evaluations of the issues.
89. This description is based on a positional negotiation strategy in which the parties ex-
change a series of offers to reach a settlement. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGO.
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Although Kovach argues that hard bargaining should riot be considered bad
faith,90 courts applying the Hunt definition could easily interpret it as bad
faith. In any event, to determine parties' good faith fairly, courts would need
to assess and second-guess the parties' offers and their states of mind.
Hunt provides a good illustration of the subjectivity of good faith and
the need for courts to investigate the parties' states of mind and bargaining
positions. In that case, the plaintiff told the mediator that she would not
accept less than $25,000. 91 Prior to the mediation, the defendant had ob-
tained settlement authority of more than $10,000 but less than $25,000.92
The defendant would have made an offer if the mediator had not privately
advised him against doing so because the plaintiff would not accept it.93 The
parties tried the case and the plaintiff received a $37,000 verdict. 94 Consid-
ering that the defendant stipulated to liability at trial, he could not rely on a
defense that he failed to make an offer based on a "good faith, objectively
reasonable belief that he [had] no liability," as set out in the court's defini-
tion of good faith.9 The Hunt court could determine whether the defen-
dant had participated in good faith only by analyzing the negotiations during
the mediation and evaluating the defendant's reason for failing to make an
offer.96
Courts do enforce good-faith standards in other legal contexts, includ-
ing labor-management collective bargaining, general contract law governing
enforcement and performance of contracts, insurers' duties in handling
claims, and participation in pretrial conferences under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(f). 97 Legal rules involving good faith outside the mediation
TIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 3-14 (2d ed. 1991). Although negotiators sometimes
use other strategies, they often use a positional strategy in legal cases.
90. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 610-11; accord Weston, supra note 4, at 627.
91. Hunt, 1996 WL 8037, at *3.
92. Id.
93. Id. Apparently the mediator and/or parties testified at the hearing about private caucus
conversations with both parties, which usually are confidential. Without this unraveling of media-
tion confidentiality, all the court would have known in assessing the defendant's good faith was
that the defendant stipulated to liability at trial. Under the Uniform Mediation Act, the existence
and amount of any offers and related communications would be privileged communications inad-
missible in evidence. See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 4 (2001), available at http://
www.law.upenn.eduibll/ulc/ulc-final.htm. For a discussion of problems in enforcing good-faith re-
quirements due to confidentiality protections of mediation, see infra Part I.C.5.
94. Hunt, 1996 WL 8037, at *3.
95. See supra text accompanying note 87.
96. If the mediator had not informed the defendant of the plaintiffs "bottom line" and the
defendant had offered, say, $15,000, the court would have needed evidence to determine if he had
"rationally evaluated his risks and potential liability," again analyzing his state of mind and the
merits of his bargaining strategy. Id.
97. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 586-87; Weston, supra note 4, at 622-26 (arguing that the
good-faith standards in nonmediation contexts are relevant to the definition of good faith in the
mediation context).
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context, however, are distinguishable from mediation cases for at least two
reasons. 98
First, whereas proponents of a good-faith requirement in mediation ar-
gue that good faith in mediation should be independent of the parties' states
of mind or negotiating positions, 99 in the nonmediation contexts, courts rely
heavily on these factors in deciding about good faith.100 For example, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently upheld sanctions be-
cause, in a Rule 16 settlement conference, the defendant "concealed its true
position that it never intended to settle the case."101 In labor law, "surface
bargaining" is a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith.10 2 Surface
bargaining is the "pretense of bargaining" and includes such things as attend-
ing meetings with no intention of reaching agreement, regressive bargaining,
98. Many areas of legal doctrine include a jurisprudence of good faith. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to provide a thorough analysis of that jurisprudence. This Article focuses on a few
aspects of good faith that are distinguishable in mediation and other contexts. See Robert S. Sum-
mers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
810, 818-21 (1982) (arguing that good faith is properly conceptualized by excluding bad-faith
conduct, which varies depending on the context).
99. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
100. In the labor context, parties must make "a sincere, serious effort to adjust differences and
to reach an acceptable common ground." NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1187
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). In preparing for pretrial conferences under Rule 16, individu-
als must "evaluate discovered facts and intelligently analyze legal issues." Francis v. Women's Obstet-
rics & Gynecology Group, 144 F.R.D. 646, 647-48 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (emphasis added).
Interpreting the duty of good faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts under the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement of Contracts, courts analyze whether parties
demonstrate "honesty in fact." See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b) (amended 2000); RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). Moreover, this duty of good faith in the
commercial contract context does not apply to the formation of contracts, see RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1981), whereas the focus of mediation is the formation of
contracts. In the insurance context, many, if not most, courts hold that bad faith involves some
intentional wrongdoing. Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litiga-
tion, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 97-98 (1994). For example, the Michigan Supreme Court stated
that bad faith requires some "arbitrary, reckless, indifferent, or intentional disregard of the interests of
the person owed a duty." Commercial Union Ins. Co., v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 161,
164 (Mich. 1986) (emphasis added).
101. Guillory v. Domtar Indus., 95 F.3d 1320, 1335 (5th Cit. 1996). This case illustrates that
courts sometimes base determinations of good faith on the perceived reasonableness of settlement
offers but have a hard time acknowledging that reasoning. Although the court denied that the
defendant was sanctioned because it refused to make a settlement offer with "a realistic potential of
being accepted," it affirmed sanctions because the defendant was never willing to make a "substan-
tial contribution" to a settlement fund of millions of dollars and always had taken the position that
it would rather try the case. Id. at 1334-35.
102. See ConAgra, Inc. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1435, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (defining surface
bargaining as "sabotaging the negotiations to manufacture an impasse while making a show of
negotiating in good faith").
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and submitting proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.103 In some cases, the
only evidence of bad faith may be the parties' offers, and thus the courts must
engage in a detailed analysis of the parties' substantive bargaining
positions.' 04
An illustration from the labor context demonstrates why it is inappro-
priate to transplant concepts of good faith into mediation from other areas of
legal doctrine. In Eastern Maine Medical Center v. NLRB,'0 5 the Maine State
Nurses Association (the union) filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the Medical Center (the hospital) for refusing to bargain in good faith. Af-
ter a nine-day hearing, an administrative law judge ruled in favor of the
union; the National Labor Relations Board and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit upheld the decision on this issue. The bargaining his-
tory was "traversed in minute detail" in administrative hearings, as well as in
the proceeding in the court of appeals. 0 6 The hospital did not present an
economic proposal for five months after receiving the union's first economic
proposal and three months after bargaining began. It refused to engage in
''serious" economic negotiations unless the union agreed to its noneconomic
demands. Its proposals of 5 (and later 6) percent wage increases represented
a substantial loss in the nurses' wage position compared to other hospital
employees. The hospital's economic proposal was offered only as a package
and was conditioned on acceptance of its noneconomic proposal. The latter
included an extensive management rights clause linked to a clause requiring
the union to waive its rights to bargain over all matters covered or not cov-
ered in the agreement. Despite many concessions by the union, the hospital
rejected the recommendation of a Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Board of Inquiry that the hospital compensate the nurses for their loss of
equity position due to a wage freeze. The court found that the hospital had
bargained in bad faith.10 7
Eastern Maine Medical Center demonstrates that to make factual deter-
minations of good faith in labor negotiation, adjudicators may need to en-
gage in extensive examinations of the parties' intentions and the merits of
their negotiation positions. Without such inquiries, adjudicators could not
determine whether parties are engaging in surface bargaining. Thus, an
analogy from the duty to bargain in good faith in labor negotiations is inap-
plicable to a good-faith requirement in mediation because courts and com-
103. See id. "Surface bargaining" is a term of art in the context of collective bargaining
negotiations. For an analog in the litigation context, see the quote from a Toronto commercial
litigator at text accompanying supra note 2.
104. See E. Me. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1, 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1981).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 10-13.
107. Id.
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mentators agree that in mediation, courts should not examine the substance
of the parties' positions, whether they make offers, or their states of mind.O8
A second distinction between mediation and other legal contexts is
that mediation communications are generally confidential and not admissi-
ble in court, unlike communications in the context of bad-faith claims in-
volving labor negotiations, performance and enforcement of contracts,
handling of insurance claims, and pretrial conference contexts. In disputes
about compliance with a good-faith requirement in these nonmediation con-
texts, parties should expect that the courts will admit evidence of the dis-
puted conduct. 10 9  By contrast, mediation is based on a norm of
confidentiality, and a new rule creating an exception to confidentiality pro-
tections would be needed to adjudicate bad-faith claims in mediation10
This analysis demonstrates that the definition of good faith in media-
tion is very uncertain, that analogies from other areas of law are misleading,
and that one cannot simply "know [bad faith] when one sees it.""' Most
people would probably think that they "know" bad faith to mean intention-
ally refraining from making a "reasonable offer," but the cases and commen-
tary indicate that this would not constitute bad faith in mediation, unlike
other legal contexts.1,2 On the other hand, most people would probably not
think of bad faith as the failure to attend a mediation or to submit certain
documents. Yet those are the only behaviors that courts have consistently
found to be bad faith in mediation. Thus, simply borrowing the concept of
good faith is very confusing and problematic. Part II.C proposes require-
ments for mediation participants that are more clear and objectively deter-
minable than behaving in good faith.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61, 83-84.
109. As proponents of a good-faith requirement in mediation point out, it is virtually impossi-
ble to enforce good-faith requirements without admitting relevant evidence. See Kovach, supra
note 4, at 602; Weston, supra note 4, at 633.
110. This is discussed further infra in Part I.C.5.
111. See supra note 23. Ambiguity in the meaning of good faith may have a beneficial effect
in some situations-for example, when mortgage lenders are required to exercise good faith in
decisions to foreclose on loans, if the ambiguity causes the lenders to be cautious about taking
advantage of borrowers. See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the
Rhetoric of Good Faith, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1035, 1108-10 (citing potential benefit of "in ter-
rorem" effect due to uncertainty about meaning of good faith). Thus, in the mortgage context the
ambiguity in the definition promotes the policy goals, whereas in the mediation context, propo-
nents of a good-faith requirement argue that clarity is essential. See text accompanying supra note
81. Moreover, in the mortgage context, the courts analyze the merits of the decision and there is
no expectation of confidentiality, unlike the good-faith context in mediation. See supra notes
99-110 and accompanying text.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61, 83-84.
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2. Overbreadth of Bad-Faith Concept
Kovach's and Weston's proposed good-faith requirements are so broad
that they effectively would prohibit defensible behaviors in mediation.
Under Kovach's proposed statute, 13 if one side claims that the other partici-
pated in bad faith, the moving party could use the legal process to investi-
gate whether all participants adequately prepared for the mediation,
"follow[ed] the rules set out by the mediator," engaged in "direct communi-
cation" with the other parties, "participat[ed] in meaningful discussions with
the mediator and all other participants during the mediation," and "re-
main[ed] at the mediation until the mediator determine[d] that the process is
at an end or excuse[d] the parties."114 Under Weston's proposed "totality of
the circumstances" test,' 15 this wide-ranging inquiry would be limited only
by the court's discretion.
Both proposals raise many problems. Mediators typically establish
"ground rules" at the outset of a mediation, such as a requirement that the
participants treat each other with respect and not interrupt each other.
Under Kovach's proposed statute, courts could be required to adjudicate
whether someone disobeyed the mediator's rules by being disrespectful or
interrupting others during the mediation.
Kovach states that "if the parties refuse to share particular knowledge,
they should not be compelled to do so. However, it is important that some
information be exchanged which would provide an explanation for, or the
basis of, the proposed settlement or lack thereof."116 Under a duty to engage
in direct communication and meaningful discussions, parties could be con-
fused about what information they would be compelled to disclose to the
mediator and opposing parties. In sensitive mediations, parties often want to
withhold information justifying their bargaining strategies. Although ex-
changing such information in mediation can be helpful and appropriate,
court-connected mediation should not be a substitute for formal discovery.
Kovach presumably does not intend her proposed statute to be interpreted as
such, but that could be the result.117
Relating to Kovach's proposed requirement of remaining at the media-
tion until the mediator declares an impasse or excuses the parties,1 8 she
113. See supra note 25.
114. Kovach, supra note 4, at 607-22; see also Weston, supra note 4, at 628 n.186 (citing
Kovach's proposed good-faith statute).
115. Weston, supra note 4, at 630.
116. Kovach, supra note 4, at 611; see also id. at 592; Weston, supra note 4, at 628, 630.
117. Cf. Brazil, supra note 10, at 31 (criticizing the potential for a good-faith requirement to
require disclosure in mediation of privileged information). For discussion of potential abuse of
good-faith requirements, see infra text accompanying notes 151-154.
118. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 623; accord, Weston, supra note 4, at 628.
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writes that "while the good faith requirement might include remaining at
the mediation, the length of time to remain should be reasonable, such as
two or three hours rather than overnight."119 Under Kovach's proposal, me-
diation participants are effectively in the custody of the mediator for an
open-ended period.120 Even if the text of Kovach's proposed statute in-
cluded a requirement of reasonableness, participants who believe that con-
tinued mediation would be unproductive could legitimately wonder whether
mediators or judges would second-guess those judgments.121
3. Inclusion of Settlement-Authority Requirement
Although mediations generally work better when organizational parties
send representatives with a reasonable measure of settlement authority,
courts have difficulty strictly enforcing such a requirement-and regularly
doing so can stimulate counterproductive mediation tactics. Slightly more
than half of the courts have found bad faith when entities fail to send repre-
sentatives with sufficient settlement authority.122 An element of good faith
in Kovach's proposed statute is "personal attendance at the mediation by all
parties who are fully authorized to settle the dispute."123 Even Sherman, a
critic of good-faith requirements, favors requiring attendance by a person
with settlement authority.14
Professor Leonard Riskin provides a useful framework for analyzing the
meaning of full settlement authority. He notes that this issue arises only
with organizational litigants, and he argues that full settlement authority for
organizational representatives should resemble certain attributes of individ-
ual litigants. These attributes are (1) authority to make a commitment, (2)
sufficient knowledge of the organization's needs, interests, and operations,
(3) sufficient influence within the organization that the representative's rec-
ommendations likely would affect the organization's decisions, and (4) dis-
119. Kovach, supra note 4, at 584.
120. The notion of mediation participants being in the custody of the mediator may not be as
extreme as it sounds. In a recent case, the court upheld an order requiring an insurance representa-
tive to be deposed about whether he left the mediation without the mediator's permission. In re
Daley, 29 S.W.3d 915, 918-19 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
121. A mediation involving mediator Eric Green illustrates this potential problem. The medi-
ation began at noon. At 11:00 P.M., the plaintiff suggested stopping for the night, but Green
pressed the parties to stay because he wanted to "keep the heat on and settle tonight." Lavinia E.
Hall, Eric Green: Finding Alternatives to Litigation in Business Disputes, in WHEN TALK WORKS:
PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 279, 299-300 (Deborah M. Kolb ed., 1994). Under a good-faith regime,
it would be understandable if the plaintiff would hesitate to leave for fear that the mediator would
report him to the court and that sanctions might follow.
122. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
123. Kovach, supra note 4, at 622; accord Weston, supra note 4, at 628.
124. See Sherman, supra note 10, at 2103-11; accord Winston, supra note 10, at 201-02.
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cretion to negotiate arrangements that are likely to be accepted by the
organization. 2 ' He writes that possessing only two or three of these attrib-
utes would be sufficient to constitute full settlement authority, recognizing
that organizations sometimes have difficulty finding representatives with all
these attributes. 1 6 He argues that the representative's role as an executive,
full-time general counsel, or outside part-time counsel does not necessarily
indicate whether the particular individual has these attributes. 2 7 Riskin's
analysis suggests that to enforce a settlement-authority requirement, courts
would need to interrogate witnesses about the extent to which various actual
or potential representatives possess the four listed attributes.
Many rules and court orders merely state that representatives must have
"full" settlement authority, without defining the term. Some requirements
are more specific, using provisions such as those in Physicians Protective Trust
Fund v. Overman, 2" in which the court ordered attendance by a representa-
tive with "full and absolute authority to resolve the matter for the lesser of
the policy limits or the most recent demand of the adverse party."'12 9
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp. 130 illustrates the difficul-
ties of implementing a requirement of attendance with appropriate settle-
ment authority. In Heileman, the controversy surrounded the attendance of
a representative who had authority to speak for one of the parties and "his
authority was to make no offer."'13  The district court concluded that
"[n]either the fact that [the organization] did not want to settle, nor the
soundness of [its] reasons for [its] positions, are relevant to the question of
[its] obligation to comply with the order to attend" with settlement author-
ity. 132 Sitting en banc, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
by a six to five vote, affirmed an imposition of sanctions for failure to send a
corporate representative with appropriate settlement authority.13 In defin-
ing the representative's required settlement authority, the majority used a
narrower formulation than in Physicians Protective Trust Fund. The Heileman
majority ruled that the corporate representative attending the pretrial con-
125. Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G.
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059, 1110 (1991).
126. Id. at 1110-11.
127. Id. at 1112.
128. 636 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
129. Id. at 827; see also Riskin, supra note 125, at 1110 n.181 (quoting a settlement confer-
ence order with a similar provision). Much of the discussion about settlement authority focuses on
defendants. Presumably the same principles should apply to plaintiffs that are organizations. If so,
such plaintiffs could be required to attend with authority to dismiss the complaint or accept a
nuisance-value offer.
130. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
131. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275, 279 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
132. Id. at 280.
133. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653-57.
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ference was required to "hold a position within the corporate entity allowing
him to speak definitively and to commit the corporation to a particular posi-
tion in the litigation."'134
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook's dissent in Heileman highlights the
problems with settlement-authority requirements. He argues that the major-
ity does not consider realistically the structure of most corporations 135 and
that requiring attendance by a representative with settlement authority
would force a party to make an offer it did not want to make.136 Judge Eas-
terbrook identifies a legitimate concern about courts using a settlement-au-
thority requirement to coerce settlement, which is illustrated by Lockhart v.
Patel1.37 In that case, an advisory jury in a summary jury trial had made a
nonbinding award of $200,000. Following the summary jury trial, the court
held several formal and informal pretrial and settlement conferences. The
attorney for the insurance carrier, St. Paul, advised the court that he had
been authorized to offer no more than $125,000 and told not to negotiate
any further. The plaintiff's last demand was $175,000. Judge William 0.
134. Id. at 653.
135. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook writes:
Both magistrate and judge demanded the presence not of a "corporate representative"
in the sense of a full-time employee but of a representative with "full authority to settle."
Most corporations reserve power to agree (as opposed to power to discuss) to senior manag-
ers or to their boards of directors-the difference depending on the amounts involved.
Heileman wanted $4 million, a sum within the province of the board rather than a single
executive even for firms much larger than Oat. [Oat's representative] came with power to
discuss and recommend; he could settle the case on terms other than cash; he lacked only
power to sign a check. The magistrate's order therefore must have required either (a)
changing the allocation of responsibility within the corporation, or (b) sending a quorum of
Oat's Board.
Id. at 664 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Although it might be hard to imagine Judge Easterbrook's suggestion that a court would order
attendance of the board of directors, the Florida Court of Appeals upheld an order requiring a full
board of directors to attend a mediation. Physicians Protective Trust Fund v. Overman, 636 So. 2d
827, 829 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
136. Judge Easterbrook writes:
A defendant convinced it did no wrong may insist on total vindication.... The order we
affirm today compels persons who have committed no wrong, who pass every requirement of
Rules 11 and 68, who want only the opportunity to receive a decision on the merits, to
come to court with open checkbooks on pain of being held in contempt....
What is the point of insisting on such authority if not to require the making of
offers and the acceptance of "reasonable" counteroffers-that is, to require good faith nego-
tiations and agreements on the spot? ... What the magistrate found unacceptable was that
[Oat's representative] might say something like "I'll relay that suggestion to the Board of
Directors", which might say no. Oat's CEO could have done no more. We close our eyes
to reality in pretending that Oat was required only to be present while others "voluntarily"
discussed settlement.
Heileman, 871 F.2d at 664-65 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
137. 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
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Bertelsman prided himself as "[h]aving had some success with settlement
conferences" and ordered the parties to attend an additional settlement con-
ference.138 For this settlement conference, the carrier was ordered to send
the person who had issued the instruction limiting St. Paul's offer or one
with equal authority, and the court instructed the attorney, "Tell them not
to send some flunky who has no authority to negotiate. I want someone who
can enter into a settlement in this range without having to call anyone
else."139 At the settlement conference, the local office adjuster appeared and
said that her instructions were to reiterate the previous offer and not to
bother to call back if it was not accepted. When asked if there was a misun-
derstanding about who was required to attend, the adjuster said, "I doubt if
anyone from the home office would have come down even if in fact this is
what you said."'140 The court found that this behavior was contemptuous,
struck the defendant's pleadings, and declared him in default.141 The court
further ordered that "the trial set for the next day would be limited to dam-
ages only [and set a hearing to] show cause why St. Paul should not be pun-
ished for criminal contempt .... Later that day, St. Paul settled with the
plaintiff for $175,000."142
Sherman cites Lockhart as an "extreme example" of improper conduct
that is "an appropriate fact situation for sanctions."143 The court appropri-
ately imposed sanctions for contempt in this case, but the case illustrates the
dangers of sanctions for violating a settlement-authority requirement. Cer-
tainly St. Paul did not comply with the court's order, and the adjuster's testi-
mony reflected disrespect of the court's authority. Although the Lockhart
court repeated the familiar notion that "the court cannot require any party
to settle a case,"144 St. Paul may have understandably believed that the
court had ordered a series of settlement conferences intending to exert heavy
pressure to settle on terms that the court believed were reasonable. St. Paul
might have avoided this problem if it had been less honest. It could have
sent a representative with formal "authority" to settle for up to $175,000 but
with a clear understanding that any settlement above $125,000 would be
unsatisfactory to top company officials (and harmful to the representative's
prospects for advancement within the company). When the court would ask
why St. Paul would not increase its offer, the representative could provide a
response relating to the facts of the case rather than lack of authority. The





143. Sherman, supra note 10, at 2107.
144. Lockhart, 115 F.R.D. at 47; see also Kovach, supra note 4, at 603 ("Good faith should not
coerce the parties to resolve their dispute on any particular economic basis.").
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representative might have to withstand withering criticism of St. Paul's posi-
tion from a judge proud of his settlement prowess,145 but St. Paul could avoid
sanctions for violating the settlement-authority requirement. Regardless of
whether the case was worth $175,000 or more, 146 judges and mediators
should not substitute their judgments in place of the parties' judgment about
appropriate settlement terms. As Judge Easterbrook argues in his Heileman
dissent, a settlement-authority requirement can effectively interfere with
parties' right to make decisions about their cases. 47
When courts focus heavily on settlement authority, participants may be
distracted from various ways that mediation can help litigants achieve goals
other than reaching final monetary settlements. Settlement-authority re-
quirements typically focus only on monetary resolutions; mediation can be
useful to explore nonmonetary aspects of disputes. These requirements also
assume that cases should be settled at a single meeting; in some cases it may
be appropriate to meet several times, especially when organizational repre-
sentatives need to consult officials within the organization based on infor-
mation learned at mediation. Moreover, settlement-authority requirements
do not recognize benefits of exchanging information, identifying issues, and
making partial or procedural agreements in mediation. Part II.C.3 offers an
alternative to a settlement-authority requirement.
4. Questionable Deterrent Effect and Potential Abuse
of Bad-Faith Sanctions
Sanctioning bad faith in mediation actually may stimulate adversarial
and dishonest conduct, contrary to the intent of proponents of a good-faith
requirement. Proponents argue that a good-faith requirement would cause
people to negotiate sincerely, would deter bad-faith behavior, and, when
people violate the requirement, would provide appropriate remedies.148
Although a good-faith requirement presumably would deter and punish
some inappropriate conduct, it might also encourage surface bargaining, 149 as
well as frivolous claims of bad faith or threats to make such claims. Propo-
145. Cf. Alfini, supra note 8, at 68-71 (describing the "bashing" style of mediation often used
by retired judges who aggressively "bash" each side's offers).
146. In summary jury trials, mock juries consider abbreviated presentations from each side
and then issue advisory verdicts to be used by the parties as information in settlement negotiations.
Although these advisory verdicts can be helpful, they are not necessarily reliable indicators of the
likely outcomes in real trials due to differences in the material presented in the two proceedings.
See Beverly J. Hodgson & Robert A. Fuller, Summary Jury Trials in Connecticut Courts, 67 CONN.
B.J. 181, 197-99 (1993).
147. See supra note 136.
148. See Weston, supra note 4, at 643-44; see also Kovach, supra note 4, at 604.
149. For a definition of surface bargaining, see supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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nents seem to assume that participants who might act in bad faith but for
the requirement would behave properly in fear of legal sanctions. It seems at
least as likely that savvy participants who want to take inappropriate advan-
tage of mediation would use surface bargaining techniques so that they can
pursue their strategies with little risk of sanction. This would be fairly easy
given the vagueness of a good-faith requirement. 5 0 Participants can readily
make "lowball" offers that they know the other side will reject and generally
go through the motions of listening to the other side and explaining the
rationale for their positions. Although attorneys often are quite sincere,
making arguments with feigned sincerity is a skill taught in law school and
honed in practice. Because mediators are not supposed to force people to
settle, participants who are determined not to settle can wait until the medi-
ator gives up. This scenario illustrates how a good-faith requirement could
ironically induce dishonesty, when providing more honest responses might
put participants in jeopardy of being sanctioned.
Similarly, tough mediation participants could use good-faith require-
ments offensively to intimidate opposing parties and interfere with lawyers'
abilities to represent their clients' legitimate interests. Given the vagueness
and overbreadth of the concept of bad faith,15' innocent participants may
have legitimate fears about risking sanctions when they face an aggressive
opponent5 2 and do not know what a mediator would say if called to testify.
In the typical conventions of positional negotiation in which each side starts
by making an extreme offer, each side may accuse the other of bad faith.
Without the threat of bad-faith sanctions, these moves are merely part of the
kabuki dance of negotiation. With the prospect of such sanctions, bad-faith
claims take on legal significance that can spawn not only satellite litigation,
but satellite mediation as well.1 3 After a volley of bad-faith charges in a
mediation, mediators may need to focus on bad faith as a real issue rather
than simply a negotiation gambit. Moreover, the mediator could be a poten-
tial witness in court about the purity of each side's faith in the mediation,
further warping the mediator's role. 154
150. See supra Part I.C.1.
151. See supra notes 85, 114-121 and accompanying text.
152. Proponents seem to assume that mediation participants who are truly acting appropri-
ately would have nothing to fear from good-faith requirements. Unfortunately, courts regularly
make some errors (evidenced, in part, by reversals of decisions), and participants may understanda-
bly fear a threat of a bad-faith motion by a Rambo-style opponent. Indeed, in eleven out of sixteen
reported cases in which the trial courts found bad faith in mediation, the appellate courts reversed
those decisions. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Some parties may prefer to submit to
unjustified threats of bad-faith claims rather than gamble on eventual vindication in the courts.
153. See Brazil, supra note 10, at 33; Sherman, supra note 10, at 2093.
154. For further discussion of how the potential for mediator testimony would affect the medi-
ator's role and the mediation process, see infra notes 190-191, 199-209 and accompanying text.
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Experience with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 155 sug-
gests how participants could abuse bad-faith sanctions in mediation. In
1983, Rule 11 was amended to provide that attorneys' signatures on court
documents constitute a certification that, inter alia, the document is well
grounded in fact and legitimate legal argument and that the document is not
being used for improper purposes. 56 The 1983 amendment required courts
to award monetary sanctions for violation of the rule. 157
Professor Georgene Vairo found that the amendment to Rule 11 "trig-
gered an avalanche of 'satellite litigation."'158 One of the reasons for this
avalanche was that "once lawyers knew that the courts would grant sanc-
tions motions, and that the likely sanction would be an award of costs and
attorney's fees, lawyers had an incentive to bring sanctions motions to
achieve cost-shifting, which otherwise would largely be unavailable due to
the American Rule."'' 59 Reviewing numerous empirical studies of the impact
of Rule 11, Vairo notes that although the 1983 amendment of Rule 11 gen-
erated some benefits, they were overshadowed by the unintended side ef-
fects. Rule 11 caused lawyers to "stop and think" before filing court
documents, "raise[d] the level of lawyering across a broad spectrum of prac-
tice," and contributed to reduced filings of boilerplate documents and ques-
tionable cases.160 On the other hand, Vairo finds that Rule 11 was
overused 6l and created animosity between attorneys. 162 She concludes that
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1993).
157. See id.
158. Georgene Vairo, Rule I 1 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 598 (1998) (citing
research finding frequent Rule 11 motions and threats of sanctions). Vairo reported that:
Prior to 1983, there were only a handful of reported Rule 11 decisions. Between Au-
gust 1, 1983, and December 15, 1987, 688 Rule 11 decisions were published in the federal
reporters, consisting of 496 district court opinions and 192 circuit court opinions. By 1989,
the number of reported district court cases appears to have leveled off. The number of
reported circuit court opinions continued to rise, however, as the circuit courts continued
to struggle with interpreting the rule. Moreover, the number of cases reported on computer-
ized databases continued to rise until 1993, when Rule 11 was amended again. A search as
of June 1993 revealed nearly 7000 cases.
Id. at 625-26 (footnotes omitted). Her analysis reflects only the number of reported decisions.
Presumably there were a great many unreported Rule 11 cases during this time as well.
159. Id. at 599.
160. See id. at 621-23. The studies suggest that other practices, such as Rule 16 status confer-
ences and prompt rulings on summary judgment motions, may have been more effective in deter-
ring groundless pleadings. Id. at 623.
161. See id. at 626 (citing a study finding that almost 55 percent of attorneys reported being
the target of a formal or informal threat of Rule 11 sanctions).
162. Id. at 626-28 (citing numerous studies that found worsened relationships between attor-
neys as a result of Rule 11).
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although Rule 11 clearly improved some attorney conduct, "the most signifi-
cant impact of the rule has been to cause a decline in civility."'
' 63
To correct problems caused by the 1983 amendment, Rule 11 was
amended again in 1993.164 Vairo found that the 1993 amendments substan-
tially reduced the number of Rule 11 cases.1 65 Even so, she found that the
1983 sanctions regime left lasting damage to the legal culture and relations
between lawyers. "Though most of the changes [in 1993] were intended to
scale back the more draconian aspects of Rule 11, the mindset occasioned by
the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 remained. ''166
Enactment of a rule authorizing sanctions for bad faith in mediation
could cause the same problems as the 1983 version of Rule 11. Rather than
improving the quality of interaction in mediation, it could have the perverse
effect of harming it. Citing Rules 11 and 37, Weston includes a "safe har-
bor" provision in her proposal that would require notice and a reasonable
opportunity to correct the problem before courts imposed sanctions.' 67 Such
a safe harbor provision might not solve the problem of wasted time and
money in sham mediations. If one side charges the other with being unpre-
pared or not having a representative with settlement authority, the "cure"
would be to reschedule the mediation, to which the alleged offender could
send a fully authorized representative to engage in surface bargaining. The
result would be that the innocent party would bear the time and expense of
two unproductive mediation sessions rather than only one. Thus, this well-
intentioned proposal could easily backfire.
Policymakers may have difficulty predicting the extent to which media-
tion participants would respond to a sanction-based good-faith system by
"gaming" the requirements. Perhaps participants would adopt a gaming re-
sponse relatively rarely. On the other hand, the underlying problematic be-
havior also may be fairly infrequent, and a good-faith requirement might
create more problems than it solves. This probably varies greatly by local
163. Id. at 628. Although analysts can differ about whether the benefits of Rule 11 outweigh
its costs, Vairo presents strong evidence that it resulted in major unintended negative conse-
quences. Id. at 625-28.
164. The 1993 amendments created a "safe harbor" in which motions for sanctions are to be
served but not filed for at least twenty-one days to give the alleged offender an opportunity to
correct the challenged document. The revised rule also required parties to file a separate motion
for Rule 11 sanctions rather than simply include a "tag-along" request in another motion. The
revised rule made sanctions discretionary rather than mandatory, de-emphasized monetary sanc-
tions, and included a provision authorizing payment to the court instead of or in addition to the
opposing parties. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) advisory committee
notes; GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCrIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 12-36 (2d ed.
1994).
165. See Vairo, supra note 158, at 626.
166. Id. at 594 (footnote omitted).
167. See Weston, supra note 4, at 631-32.
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legal culture. Hence, it would be appropriate to craft solutions in response
to actual local problems, where the nature and magnitude of the problems
can be more accurately assessed, rather than to rely on global speculation.168
5. Weakened Confidentiality of Mediation Communications
Establishing a good-faith requirement undermines the confidentiality of
mediation. The mere prospect of adjudicating bad-faith claims by using me-
diator testimony can distort the mediation process by damaging participants'
faith in the confidentiality of mediation communications and the mediators'
impartiality.
Proponents of a good-faith requirement cite the need for an exception
to rules providing for confidentiality 169 of communications in mediation. 170
Weston contends that a good-faith requirement is "essentially meaningless if
confidentiality privileges restrict the ability to report violations."',' Noting
the existence of some exceptions to confidentiality in mediation, she argues
that reports of bad faith should be added to the list of exceptions.' 72 Weston
and Kovach assert that an exception for bad-faith participation can be
clearly and narrowly limited, and that the need for an exception outweighs
the general need to encourage open discussion in mediation through confi-
dentiality protections. 73
Weston recognizes that creating a bad-faith exception to the confiden-
tiality rules is risky. "After-the-fact allegations of ADR [alternative dispute
resolution] bad-faith conduct can undermine participants' trust in the confi-
dentiality of ADR, create uncertainty, and potentially impair full use of the
process.' '174 In addition, "[riecognizing a privilege exception to report good-
168. See infra Part II.A.
169. In the mediation context, people use the term "confidentiality" to refer to several dis-
tinct concepts. These concepts include inadmissibility in evidence in legal proceedings, bar to
discovery, restriction on mediator testimony, and preclusion of disclosure in any context including
situations outside of legal proceedings (such as to the media). For the purpose of this Article, the
term refers to inadmissibility of evidence. Confidentiality is especially important in court-con-
nected mediation, in which court hearings loom as the alternative to a mediated settlement.
170. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 601-03; Weston, supra note 4, at 633-42. Many jurisdic-
tions have rules precluding admissibility in evidence of communications in mediations. See SARAH
R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE apps. A, B (2d ed. 2001). The UniformMediation Act (UMA) establishes a privilege that clarifies rules on admissibility of mediation
communications. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4 (2001). The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws recently approved the UMA, which has not been enacted by any
state as of this writing. Although a few court rules with good-faith requirements explicitly create
confidentiality exceptions relating to good faith, see, e.g., D.C. E.D. Mo. Loc. R. 16.6.04(A)(1997), most rules reviewed for this Article do not address this issue.
171. Weston, supra note 4, at 633; see also Kovach, supra note 4, at 602.
172. See Weston, supra note 4, at 636-38.
173. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 602-03; Weston, supra note 4, at 638-42.
174. Weston, supra note 4, at 633.
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faith violations carries the risk that the exception would be misused by dis-
gruntled parties and simply swallow the confidentiality rule.'1 5 Requiring
testimony from a mediator in bad-faith hearings creates related problems.
Kovach suggests solving this problem by having mediators file affidavits or
testify about the conduct in question without making determinations
whether the conduct constitutes bad faith. 76 As Weston notes, however,
"[plermitting disclosures for good-faith-violation claims also raises the con-
cern that the role of the third-party neutral is compromised where the neu-
tral is a witness to the alleged bad-faith ADR conduct." 77
To solve these problems, Weston recommends that evidence of bad
faith be heard by a court in camera to determine whether a confidentiality
privilege exception is warranted, preferably by a judge who would not deter-
mine the underlying merits of the case. She argues that this approach,
"combined with sanctions for asserting frivolous claims of bad-faith partici-
pation, balances the concerns for ensuring good-faith participation and justi-
fied confidentiality in ADR."'178
The proponents have identified correctly concerns that a good-faith
requirement could undermine participants' trust in the confidentiality of me-
diation because of uncertainty about what might later be used in court. An
exception for bad faith does not seem as narrow and definite as the propo-
nents suggest, however. The vagueness and overbreadth of the concept 179
contribute to participants' uncertainty about whether their statements in
mediation would be used against them.
Proposals for admitting mediators' testimony presume that courts need
such testimony to pursue their mission of seeking truth and justice and that
mediators' testimony is highly probative and reliable because mediators are
the only source of disinterested, neutral evidence about conduct in media-
tion.18 0 Certainly mediators' testimony can be helpful, but one can overstate
its value. Much discussion in mediation does not focus on facts strictly rele-
175. Id. at 638.
176. Kovach, supra note 4, at 602.
177. See Weston, supra note 4, at 639. Parties have a due process right to cross-examine
mediators whose bad-faith reports are considered in evidence. See McLaughlin v. Super. Ct., 189
Cal. Rptr. 479, 485 (Ct. App. 1983) (requiring cross-examination of mediator who makes recom-
mendation to court about child custody or visitation); Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 515 (1989). The prospect of
cross-examination shifts the role of the mediator from a neutral facilitator to a potential adverse
witness.
178. Weston, supra note 4, at 642; see id. at 645.
179. See supra notes 85, 114-121 and accompanying text.
180. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 602. In one case, the court premised its decision to require
mediator testimony on this basis, deciding that mediators may be required to testify even if there is
other evidence of the fact at issue because mediators "carry more weight of credibility." Rinaker v.
Super. Ct., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 473 (1998).
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vant to legal issues and often involves feelings, interests, expected conse-
quences of various options, negotiation strategy, and even analysis of
hypothetical situations.181 Moreover, if called to testify at such hearings,
mediators may have significant biases even if the mediators have the highest
integrity. Mediators would be interested in presenting themselves and their
actions in mediation in a favorable light. If a mediator reports that a partici-
pant has not participated in good faith, courts should expect that the media-
tor might emphasize facts consistent with that conclusion and downplay
inconsistent facts.182 Thus, one should not simply assume that mediator tes-
timony is necessarily neutral, probative, and reliable.
The Uniform Mediation Act's (UMA's) provisions regarding confiden-
tiality of mediation communications are relevant to the admissibility of evi-
dence of bad faith. The main provision establishes an evidentiary privilege
for mediation communications. 183 Section 6 includes nine exceptions to the
privilege; bad faith in mediation is not one of them.184 Section 7 generally
precludes mediator disclosures, with limited exceptions; again, bad faith is
not among them.185
Weston's suggestion for in camera proceedings does not completely
solve the problem. Relying on Rinaker v. Superior Court86 and Oam v. Con-
gress Mortgage Co.,187 she argues that this procedure should be used so that
the complaining party can make a threshold showing of bad faith before
public disclosure of the alleged misconduct.1i 8 In Rinaker and O/am, the
courts set out balancing tests for determining whether to admit mediator
testimony. 189 As Judge Wayne Brazil notes in Oam, requiring mediators to
181. See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Judge
Wayne D. Brazil, an ADR leader, writes:
Under one approach to mediation, the primary goal is not to establish "the truth" or to
determine reliably what the historical facts actually were. Rather, the goal is to go both
deeper than and beyond history-to emphasize feelings, underlying interests, and a search
for means for social repair or reorientation.
Id.; Rinaker, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469 (quoting the mediator who argued that "[tihe heart of the
mediation exchange typically involves concessions, waivers, confusions, misstatements, confes-
sions, implications, angry words, insults" (citation omitted)).
182. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 n.22.
183. See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 4 (2001).
184. See id. § 6.
185. See id. § 7. The reporter's note states, "The [prohibited] communications by the media-
tor to the court or other authority are broadly defined. The provisions would not permit a mediator
to communicate, for example, on whether a particular party engaged in 'good faith' negotia-
tion .... " Id. § 7 reporter's note.
186. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Ct. App. 1998).
187. 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
188. See Weston, supra note 4, at 642.
189. Under the Rinaker procedure, if a party makes a prima facie showing that a mediation
communication would be relevant, the court holds an in camera hearing to determine if the media-
tor is competent to testify about the issue, whether the mediator's testimony is probative, and
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give evidence about events in mediation, even in camera or under seal,
"threatens values underlying the mediation privileges. '' 190
Good mediators are likely to feel violated by being compelled to give
evidence that could be used against a party with whom they tried to
establish a relationship of trust during a mediation. Good mediators
are deeply committed to being and remaining neutral and non-judg-
mental, and to building and preserving relationships with parties. To
force them to give evidence that hurts someone from whom they ac-
tively solicited trust (during the mediation) rips the fabric of their
work and can threaten their sense of the center of their professional
integrity. These are not inconsequential matters....
... [T]he possibility that a mediator might be forced to testify
over objection could harm the capacity of mediators in general to
create the environment of trust that they feel maximizes the likeli-
hood that constructive communication will occur during the media-
tion session. 191
Thus, a policy requiring evidence of mediation communications, espe-
cially where mediators might be compelled to testify, can cause serious harm
to the overall mediation practice in a community if mediation participants
do not have confidence that the courts will uphold assurances of confidenti-
ality. Anticipating that their statements in mediation could be used against
them, participants would have an incentive to posture defensively.
Comparing the Rinaker-Olam in camera procedure with the UMA's
comparable procedure 192 illustrates problems with Weston's proposal. The
UMA procedure protects confidential mediation communications more than
Rinaker and Olam in two ways. First, under the UMA in camera procedure,
evidence may be admitted only if the "need for the evidence substantially
outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality.1' 93 Rinaker and Olam
do not include such a requirement. 194 Second, under the UMA, courts may
admit evidence of mediation communications only if the evidence is not
otherwise available.95 Rinaker and Olam permit exceptions to confidential-
whether the interest in admitting the evidence outweighs the interest in maintaining the confiden-
tiality of mediation. Rinaker, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472-73. The Olam court followed the Rinaker
procedure and elaborated the balancing test. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
190. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. See also cases cited therein.
191. Id. at 1133-34.
192. Although the UMA does not recognize bad faith as an exception to a mediation privi-
lege, the UMA establishes an in camera procedure for two other unrelated exceptions. See UNIF.
MEDIATION ACT § 6(b) (2001).
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. See supra note 189.
195. See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 6(b) (2001).
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ity even if there is other evidence to establish the facts sought to be estab-
lished with the mediation communications.1 96
Proposals for a confidentiality exception for reports of bad faith are not
justified. The UMA includes model language describing the goals of the
statute, the first of which is to "promote candor of parties through confiden-
tiality of the mediation process, subject only to the need for disclosure to
accommodate specific and compelling societal interests."'197 The benefits of
bad-faith sanctions (especially when offset by the problems described in Part
I of this Article) do not outweigh the need for justified faith in the confiden-
tiality of mediation.198
6. Encouragement of Inappropriate Mediator Conduct
A good-faith requirement gives mediators too much authority over par-
ticipants to direct the outcome in mediation and creates the risk that some
mediators would coerce participants by threatening to report alleged bad-
faith conduct. 199 Courts can predict abuse of that authority given the settle-
ment-driven culture in court-connected mediation.200 The mere potential
for courts to require mediators' reports can corrupt the mediation process by
instilling fear and doubt in the participants.
196. See Rinaker, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. In Clam, the court required testimony from the
mediator even though there was sufficient evidence from the plaintiffs own doctor and former
attorney to support the court's finding against her. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-50. The Clam
decision illustrates the weakness of the Rinaker-Olam procedure in that the Olam court overrode
statutory confidentiality protections even though the mediator's testimony merely corroborated
other credible evidence.
197. UNIF. MEDIATION AcT prefatory note (2001).
198. Elsewhere I have suggested that confidentiality in mediation may not be needed as much
as commonly assumed because some participants make statements without relying on confidential-
ity protections. See John Lande, Toward More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL.
321, 331-32; see also Christopher Honeyman, Confidential, More or Less, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Win-
ter 1998, at 12; Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85
MARQ. L. REV. 9 (2001). Although people can mediate productively without assurances of confi-
dentiality in some cases, mediation would be unproductive in many other cases if participants did
not have a clear and justified expectation that mediation communications would not later be used
against them in court.
199. This discussion assumes that mediators would be permitted to testify. Some statutes or
rules prohibit such evidence, while other authorities permit mediator reports about bad faith. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text. If mediators cannot provide evidence for good-faith hear-
ings, but mediation participants are permitted to testify about mediation communications, it might
reduce fear of mediator coercion, but it could encourage participants to posture in mediation in
anticipation of possible bad-faith hearings.
200. To prevent mediator coercion of participants, a California statute prohibits mediator
communications to courts about mediations. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1121 Law Revision Commission
comment (West 2002) ("[A] mediator should not be able to influence the result of a mediation or
adjudication by reporting or threatening to report to the decisionmaker on the merits of the dispute
or reasons why mediation failed to resolve it.").
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Proponents of a good-faith requirement apparently assume that
mediators will not abuse any good-faith reporting authority to coerce parties
into accepting mediators' opinions about appropriate resolutions. The pro-
ponents also seem to assume that even if mediators do not abuse their good-
faith reporting authority, participants will not fear taking positions at odds
with the mediators' apparent views and will not perceive mediators as
biased.201
These assumptions are troubling. Kovach warns of the dangers of eval-
uative mediation, in which mediators express opinions about the merits of
the issues. 20 2 Weston cites risks when the parties have unequal bargaining
power and mediators pressure the weaker parties.203 These risks are very
real.204 When mediators express opinions about specific aspects of a case or
its ultimate merits, they risk creating injustice through heavy-handed pres-
sure tactics. 20 5 Even without the prospect of a later court hearing about
good-faith participation, mediation participants sometimes feel pressured to
change their positions in response to mediator evaluations and "reality-test-
ing" questions.206 Under a bad-faith sanctions regime, mediators might apply
201. These assumptions are largely implicit in their proposals, though Kovach writes, "It will
be assumed that the mediator is one who adheres to current established ethical guidelines, however
problematic." Kovach, supra note 4, at 585.
202. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 passim (1996); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love,
Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 71 passim (1998);
Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather Than One Eclec-
tic Process, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 295, 303-05. Though evaluative mediation may be appropriate
when participants request it and when done properly, Kovach and Love have legitimate concerns
about the risks of evaluative mediation techniques. See Lawyering and Mediation Transformation,
supra note 6, at 872-74; Lande, supra note 198, at 325-27.
203. Weston, supra note 4, at 603-17.
204. See, e.g., Christopher Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in Mediation, 1985 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL.
141. Honeyman wryly and insightfully cites "the well-known definition of a mediator as someone
who listens to and reasons politely with both parties only until he is sure which is weaker, and then
jumps on that one with both feet." Id. at 146. Although Honeyman's case examples took place
outside the litigation context and most court-connected mediations do not operate this way, there
is enough truth in this observation to raise concerns, especially where mediators commonly use an
evaluative style.
205. Lande, supra note 198, at 325-27. Mediation participants can feel abused by mediator
evaluation in some situations and can appreciate it in others, depending on how mediators express
their evaluations. In studying civil mediation in Ohio courts, for example, Roselle Wissler found
that parties' perception of being pressured by mediators was not related to whether mediators ex-
pressed their evaluations of a case. Wissler, supra, note 11, at 684. By contrast, parties whose
mediators recommended a particular settlement felt more pressured to settle than parties whose
mediators did not make such recommendations. Id. Depending on the context in particular cases,
participants may experience mediators' evaluations or suggestions of settlement options as settle-
ment pressure. For further discussion about parties' and attorneys' views about mediator evaluation,
see infra notes 264, 268-271, 277 and accompanying text.
206. Although mediators differ about the propriety of mediators expressing evaluations re-
garding the merits of disputes, most would agree that mediators may appropriately ask "reality-
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pressure arising from their authority to testify about bad faith. If local courts
hold a sufficient number of bad-faith hearings, participants may reasonably
fear the effect of mediators' reports, even if mediators do not threaten to
report bad faith. z07
An actual case illustrates these problems. In a wrongful employment
termination case, mediator Eric Green told the defendant's representatives
that they should know "that the judge has no desire to hear this case," sug-
gesting that the court might rule against the defendant if it failed to "live up
to its moral obligations" to settle the case.20 8 When the plaintiff insisted on
receiving more than $600,000, the maximum appropriate amount under
Green's litigation decision analysis, he asked the plaintiff, "How greedy can
you get?"209 The case report does not indicate that Green explicitly accused
either side of acting in bad faith, but it would have been consistent with his
approach for him to have done so. In any event, if the court would permit
Green to testify at a bad-faith hearing, both sides would have reason to fear
his testimony.
Although enforcing good-faith requirements in mediation might im-
prove conduct in mediation, it risks diversion of attention and resources
from the merits of the cases and creation of serious unintended problems as
described in this part. The following part offers alternative approaches to
achieve the goals of a good-faith requirement with fewer problematic side-
effects.
1I. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE QUALITY OF PARTICIPATION
IN LOCAL MEDIATION PROGRAMS
If good-faith requirements are likely to be ineffective or counterproduc-
tive in promoting the quality and integrity of court-connected mediation
programs, what policies are more likely to be effective? This part addresses
that question. Some promising policy options focus specifically on prevent-
ing behaviors that have been sanctioned under good-faith requirements,
such as failure to submit pre-mediation documents and failure to attend me-
diation. Other policy options focus on developing program features that
testing" questions. See Love & Kovach, supra note 202, at 303-05. When mediators ask "reality-
testing" questions, they often have different assumptions than do the participants about the likely
results in court or the consequences of various options. Asking "reality-testing" questions can be a
very legitimate and helpful mediation technique to help participants carefully evaluate their as-
sumptions and expectations. Depending on how mediators ask these questions, however, this tech-
nique can create some of the same problems as overt expression of mediators' opinions. Lande,
supra note 198, at 323 n.10.
207. See Brazil, supra note 10, at 32; Sherman, supra note 10, at 2094.
208. Hall, supra note 121, at 298-99.
209. Id. at 299.
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more generally address the interests of relevant stakeholders, including liti-
gants, attorneys, courts, and mediators. If programs satisfy mediation partici-
pants' interests generally, they are more likely to act productively, even if
policymakers do not specifically design the programs to promote "good faith"
behavior. This part describes how local courts can use a dispute systems
design (DSD) process to design their mediation programs to satisfy stake-
holders' interests generally and thus reduce the incidence of problematic
conduct. Before describing the DSD process, stakeholders' interests, and
some options that might address those interests, this part explains why
courts may appropriately develop local rules to operate mediation programs.
A. Use of Dispute Systems Design Principles
in Developing Local Mediation Program Policies
1. Appropriateness of Local Decisionmaking About Court-Connected
Mediation Programs
Policy issues about handling bad faith in mediation arise in the context
of a broader debate about the appropriate degree of uniformity in civil proce-
dure.a1o Some civil procedure scholars favor more uniformity in rules, argu-
ing that uniformity provides greater fairness, reduces surprise, protects
against manipulative forum-shopping, generates efficiencies through stan-
dardized procedures, promotes clarity and convenience for attorneys practic-
ing in multiple jurisdictions, increases professionalism, improves access to
courts, and encourages decisions on the merits.2 11 Others argue that local
flexibility in rulemaking encourages innovation, stimulates more efficient
rules, provides greater uniformity within local jurisdictions, and produces
greater legitimacy and efficacy because local rules relate to the circumstances
of local practice communities and users' needs."'2
Some advocates of uniformity agree that local variations are appropriate
in certain circumstances. These include local rules to fill gaps in uniform
rules, address unique local problems, undertake innovation through carefully
210. It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a thorough analysis of the debate over
uniformity of court rules. Much of the literature focuses on federal court rules, though state courts
are likely to experience similar tensions over uniformity of state court rules. See Stephen N. Sub-
rin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Pat-
terns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2037-38 (1989).
211. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45
DUKE L.J. 929, 944-52 (1996). According to Professor Paul Carrington, "[b]y the mid-1980s, the
legal clutter created by local rules had become an impediment to the practice of law, a source of
cost and delay, and a significant trap for the unwary." Id. at 951.
212. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity,
50 U. Piur. L. REV. 853, 874-75 (1989) (arguing for flexibility and adaptability and listing many
advantages of local rules).
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controlled experiments, simplify procedures,13 handle relatively minor ad-
ministrative matters,214 and accommodate local legal cultural norms. 215 One
advocate of uniformity cites settlement programs as an example of legitimate
local case management because such programs are not readily susceptible to
detailed national regulation.216
Despite criticism of local rulemaking by some commentators, 2 7 empiri-
cal analyses generally have been favorable. The Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 (CJRA)218 mandated local rulemaking by all federal district courts, and
analysts have studied the process carefully. The act required each court to
create a representative advisory group to develop local court management
practices, including ADR policies. 219 Under the CJRA, the advisory groups
were required to prepare reports including: (1) an assessment of the courts'
dockets, (2) the basis for their recommendations, and (3) recommended
measures, rules, and programs. 20 The CJRA required courts to consider the
advisory group recommendations, but courts were not required to follow
them in adopting "civil justice expense and delay reduction plans."221 The
U.S. Judicial Conference,222 a recent Federal Judicial Center guidebook,223
213. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MER
CER L. REV. 757, 787-88, 791-93 (1995).
214. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legiti-
macy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 930-31, 939 (1999).
215. See Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1447, 1484 (1994). But see Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 213, at 783-86 (rejecting
the notion that differences in local legal culture justify variations in rules).
216. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules
in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 38 (1997).
217. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 375 (1992). Professor Linda Mullenix, a passionate critic of local rulemaking, writes:
Civil procedural rulemaking ought not to be in the hands of ninety-four local amateur
rulemaking groups who are destined to wreak mischief, if not havoc, on the federal court
system. Procedural rulemaking should be restored to the federal judiciary, to be accom-
plished in slow and deliberative fashion by procedural experts through the existing [central-
ized] Advisory Committee system.
Id. at 385.
218. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-479 (2000).
219. See 28 U.S.C. § 472 (2000). The advisory groups were required to include attorneys and
representatives of major categories of litigants. § 478(b). The Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA)
local advisory group process was an innovation similar to the dispute systems design process de-
scribed infra in Part II.A.2. The CJRA expired on December 1, 1997, under a sunset provision in
the legislation. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090 § 103(b)(2)(A) (1990).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 472(b) (2000).
221. Id. § 472(a).
222. The U.S. Judicial Conference found that the "advisory group process proved to be one of
the most beneficial aspects of [the Act] by involving litigants and members of the bar in the
administration of justice" and recommended that the courts, in consultation with the advisory
groups, continue to perform regular assessments after the CJRA expired. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: FINAL REPORT 19 (1997), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/cjra/cjrafin.pdf.
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the RAND Institute for Civil Justice,22 4 and analysts Douglas K. Somerlot
and Barry Mahoney225 have all endorsed or favorably evaluated the local
advisory group process.
Local decisionmaking about court-connected mediation programs
seems especially appropriate given the wide range of views about the appro-
priate goals and techniques for mediation.226 Indeed, under the federal Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,227 each federal district court must
adopt local rules implementing its own ADR program.2 28 Program planners
must decide issues including whether mediation should be mandatory, which
cases should be referred to mediation, when litigants may opt out of media-
tion (if ever), at what stage in the litigation cases should be referred to medi-
ation, how mediators should be selected, what information should be
provided to participants about the procedures, who should attend the media-
tion, how to deal with demographic and cultural differences, how mediators
223. A Federal Judicial Center guidebook advises that courts "should, after consultation
among bench, bar and participants, define the goals and characteristics of the local ADR program
and approve it by promulgating appropriate written local rules." ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE
TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 155 (2001).
224. The RAND Institute for Civil Justice conducted a major evaluation of the CJRA, in-
cluding the operation of the court advisory groups. The RAND researchers found that the advisory
group reports "generally reflected considerable independence from the court" and that the courts
responded positively to the reports, adopting more than 75 percent of the advisory groups' major
recommendations. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTA.
TION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 26 (1996). The
researchers concluded that "the CJRA advisory group process was useful, and [that] the great major-
ity of advisory group members thought so too." Id.
Soon after the CJRA began to be implemented, Professor Lauren Robel surveyed members of
local advisory groups. She found mixed reactions, with many respondents believing that these
groups improved understanding and cooperation between bench and bar, and some believing that
the process was not worthwhile. Some respondents were not satisfied in districts that did not have
major problems to solve and where solutions required increases in resources or limitations in federal
jurisdiction that were beyond the ability of local courts to implement. See Lauren K. Robel, Grass
Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
879, 897-900, 905-06 (1993). The fact that Robel's study was conducted so soon after enactment
of the CJRA meant that advisory group members had little experience with those groups and may
explain why her findings were somewhat less positive than in the other assessments cited in the
text.
225. Douglas K. Somerlot and Barry Mahoney studied implementation of CJRA advisory
groups as well as counterparts in the California state court system. They concluded that the "emer-
gence of collaborative approaches to solving court system problems, as demonstrated by the advi-
sory committees established under the CJRA . . . provides a very hopeful model of cooperative
effort toward solving significant judicial branch problems." Douglas K. Somerlot & Barry Maho-
ney, What Are the Lessons of Civil Justice Reform? Rethinking Brookings, the CJRA, RAND, and State
Initiatives, JUDGES' J., Spring 1998, at 4, 62.
226. See Lawyering and Mediation Transformation, supra note 6, at 849-54 (summarizing the
range of mediator goals and styles). For an argument favoring pluralism in mediation, see id. at
854-57.
227. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2001).
228. Id. § 651(b).
HeinOnline  -- 50 UCLA L. Rev. 111 2002-2003
112 50 UCLA LAw REVIEW 69 (2002)
should be compensated (if at all), how courts should manage cases referred
to mediation, and how staffing of court-connected mediation programs
would affect policy options.2 9 Although some mediation policymaking
should not be delegated to local courts,230 local policymakers often can make
better decisions than central policymakers about these issues when there is
no superior uniform resolution of the issues and when the local culture, pro-
cedures, and resources critically affect the issues.
2. Applying Dispute Systems Design Techniques
in Court Settings
Courts contemplating a good-faith requirement should consider using a
dispute systems design approach to solve problems of apparent bad faith in
mediation23t and to enhance the quality of mediation programs more gener-
ally.232 DSD contrasts with traditional rulemaking processes in which ex-
229. See John Maull, ADR in the Federal Courts: Would Uniformity Be Better?, 34 DuQ. L. REV.
245, 253-56 (1996) (listing issues in which there are differences in ADR policy, including whether
participation should be mandatory, how much the court participates in structuring the procedures,
setting fees, if any, for ADR services, and any compensation for neutrals); EASTERN DISTRICT OF
MISSOURI PROCEDURES FOR ADR REFERRAL, Feb. 2000, at http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/moed/
Documents.nsf/e3f4f9697ee432df862568f6005592f4/6a676afld02fc75862568f60563ebe/$FLE/A
DRDistrict.PDF (listing individual judges' preferences about ADR referral) (last visited June 23,
2002). See generally COLE ET AL., supra note 170, at §§ 6:3-6:11, at 6-5 to 6-33; NIEMIC ET AL.,
supra note 223; ELIZABETH S. PLAPINGER ET AL., JUDGE'S DESKBOOK ON COURT ADR 39-45,
53-60 (1993); ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & MARGARET SHAW, COURT ADR: ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM
DESIGN (1992).
230. Delegating policymaking to local courts can produce unwise or ineffective policies in
some situations. See, e.g., Hugh Mclsaac, Confidentiality Revisited: California Style, 39 FAM. CT.
REV. 405 (2001) (describing numerous problems caused by a statute authorizing counties to adopt
local court rules permitting mediators to make recommendations to the court when parties do not
reach agreement).
231. Perceived bad-faith behavior may be symptomatic of a poorly designed mediation pro-
gram. If so, redesigning the program would be more appropriate than punishing mediation partici-
pants. For example, if local rules permit one side to delay a trial by demanding mediation, see, for
example, Carter, supra note 4 (manuscript at 48 n.191), attorneys or litigants predictably would
take advantage of that rule in some cases by demanding mediation without intending to settle the
case. A rule permitting such trial delays might be a cause of some inappropriate conduct. Program
planners might get better results by revising the rules to preclude such trial delays rather than by
creating a bad-faith sanctions regime.
232. The dispute system design (DSD) field dates from the 1988 publication of Getting Dis-
putes Resolved. WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO
CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988); see also John P. Conbere, Theory Building for Conflict Man-
agement System Design, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 215 (2001) (providing an overview of the DSD
field). For other prominent texts on DSD, see CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES
MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE
AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996); KARL A. SLAIKEU & RALPH H. HASSON, CONTROLLING
THE COSTS OF CONFLICT: How TO DESIGN A SYSTEM FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 64-74 (1998).
For a comparison of DSD models, see Conbere, supra (showing great similarities between DSD
models).
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perts develop proposals for adoption by authorities, often with only limited
involvement of the full range of stakeholders. 33 An inclusive policymaking
process is especially important in developing mediation program policies be-
cause judges, other court personnel, and lawyers may not be familiar with
mediation theories and practices. If policies do not satisfy stakeholders' in-
terests adequately, some people may withhold their support or actively sabo-
tage implementation of the policies.2 34
Private and public organizations use DSD to manage a continuing flow of disputes with vari-
ous stakeholder groups (such as employees, customers, and suppliers) by establishing a comprehen-
sive system usually including a range of ADR options. Thus, DSD focuses on systematically
managing a series of disputes rather than handling individual disputes on an ad hoc basis. In a
court setting, the process for designing a mediation program can be similar even though the stake-
holder groups are likely to be different, and the outcome may include litigation procedures as well
as ADR procedures. Negotiated rulemaking, which involves similar techniques, has been used in
public sector rulemaking. See infra note 237.
DSD processes have been used increasingly in recent years. For example, General Electric,
Shell Oil, and Halliburton companies used DSD procedures to revise their dispute systems. See
SLAIKEU & HASSON, supra, at 64-74.
233. Federal rules are adopted or amended following procedures prescribed in the Rules Ena-
bling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2001). The process includes initial consideration of possible
amendments by the Rules Advisory Committee; publication of and public comment on proposed
rules; consideration of the public comments and final approval by the Rules Advisory Committee;
approval by the Judicial Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure ("Standing
Committee"), Judicial Conference, and U.S. Supreme Court; and a period of at least seven months
for congressional review, during which Congress may amend or reject the proposed rule. See id.
The Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee are composed of federal judges, practicing
lawyers, law professors, state chief justices, and representatives of the Department of Justice. See
id.; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: THE RULEMAKING PRO-
CESS, A SUMMARY FOR THE BENCH AND BAR (1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
proceduresum.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2001). Although the membership of these committees
includes representation of various stakeholder groups, national committees are far removed from
most people affected by the rules. According to Professor Jeffrey W. Stempel, "[those outside the
rulemaking process are not invited to brainstorm with the rulemakers but only to react to their
product, often after an official proposal already supported by the Advisory Committee has gathered
momentum." Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in
Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 742 (1993). Stempel advo-
cates a "pluralist" or "civic republican model" of rulemaking in which a broader community, at-
tempting to arrive at a shared conception of the common good, engages in deliberation and makes
rules accordingly. Id. at 751-52.
234. Regarding one court-connected mediation program, for example, several observers have
told me that the court consulted the local mediation community in developing a good-faith re-
quirement but did not sufficiently address their concerns in developing the court's rules. The court
adopted a good-faith requirement despite the concerns of many prominent local mediators. Re-
portedly, many mediators have decided not to comply with the rule requiring them to report bad-
faith participation. Although adoption of the good-faith rule may initially induce some partici-
pants to behave appropriately, if mediators or participants do not invoke the rule periodically,
repeat players may learn that they can ignore it with impunity. If so, the rule would probably be
ineffective in curbing problematic behavior and might actually undermine respect for the court and
the mediation program. See generally COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 232, at 199-217
(discussing resistance and constraints in changing dispute resolution systems and suggesting tech-
niques for addressing them).
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Although traditional rulemaking processes sometimes engage stake-
holders in the process and produce good results, DSD offers significant po-
tential advantages. Using a DSD approach may produce more effective
policies because it often involves an explicit assessment of problems and
stakeholders' interests, participation by diverse stakeholder groups, group fa-
cilitation techniques, and systematic procedures for implementing and eval-
uating new policies. In traditional rulemaking, the process typically does not
include some or all of these procedures.235 Policymakers may be especially
effective by combining a local focus and a DSD process because stakeholders
are more likely to participate actively to develop rules than in a traditional
process.236 Research indicates that people who participate in a process are
more likely to comply with the resulting decisions.237
235. The system of local advisory groups under the CJRA involved a process similar to local
court DSD. For more information about the CJRA process, see supra notes 219-221 and accompa-
nying text. For an example of a state court system initiative that promotes dispute resolution
planning by local courts, see MARYLAND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMISSION, PRAC-
TICAL ACTION PLAN, at http://www.courts.state.md.us/draftplan.html (Oct. 8, 1999). Some courts
and court systems have used collaborative processes to plan court programs and programs generally.
See generally, e.g., FRANKLIN COUNTY FUTURES LAB PROJECT, REINVENTING JUSTICE: A PROJECT
PLANNER (1997) (manual for collaborative local court planning, published in conjunction with the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the State Justice Institute); Lucinda S. Brown, Court
and Community Parmers in Massachusetts, 81 JUDICATURE 200 (1998). For a summary of state and
local justice initiatives using collaborative processes involving the courts, the bar, and the public,
see generally ABA COMMITTEE ON STATE JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL
JUSTICE INITIATIVES: THE COURTS, THE BAR AND THE PUBLIC WORKING TOGETHER TO IMPROVE
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/justice/00summary/home.html (last
visited July 19, 2002).
236. Obviously, many individual stakeholders would not participate in a local court poli-
cymaking process. It seems likely, however, that a larger proportion of affected stakeholder com-
munities would participate in a local process than in a centralized process.
237. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit,
9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 69 (2000). Jody Freeman and Laura Langbein analyze empirical data on
regulatory negotiations (often referred to as "reg neg"), a process somewhat similar to DSD. In reg
negs, a facilitator helps stakeholder groups negotiate over public policy issues such as development
of environmental standards. Id. at 124-27. Stakeholders may include, inter alia, business interests,
environmental groups, state and local government agencies, and federal rulemaking and enforce-
ment agencies. If a reg neg process produces an agreement, the rulemaking agency normally uses
the agreement as the basis for a conventional administrative rulemaking procedure. Citing proce-
dural justice and game theory research, Freeman and Langbein argue that the participatory consen-
sus process of reg neg increases the legitimacy of and compliance with resolutions reached through
reg negs as compared with traditional rulemaking processes. See id. at 124-27, 130-32. But see
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 430-38 (2001) (citing methodological limitations of the sort of data
which Freeman and Langbein relied on and offering possible alternative explanations for their
conclusions about legitimacy and compliance). Freeman and Langbein's conclusions are consistent
with a sizeable body of research on procedural justice indicating that when people believe that a
procedure is fair, they are more likely to perceive the authorities as legitimate and to comply with
the resulting decisions. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's
Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817-26 (2001) (setting forth an extensive
analysis of procedural justice research); see also Macfarlane, supra note 87, at 696-703. For further
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A court using a DSD approach would appoint a facilitator to coordinate
the process.238 The facilitator would consult with key judges, court adminis-
trators, attorneys, mediators, regular litigants, and other stakeholders239 to
identify which stakeholder groups should be represented in the process and
which representatives should be convened as a design team to oversee the
DSD process.240 The next step would be an assessment of the court's goals,
the interests of the major stakeholder groups, the local legal culture, and the
merits of and problems with current litigation procedures.24i Based on this
assessment, the design team would consider what policies would best achieve
the court's goals and address problems identified in the assessment. The
design team would consult with members of the stakeholder groups to solicit
comments and suggestions about various policy options. The design team
would develop a plan that satisfies the interests of the stakeholders and then
submit the plan for approval by the necessary authorities 4 A DSD ap-
proach assumes that training and education are needed to implement new
procedures successfully and thus the design team would plan to arrange for
appropriate training and education for key stakeholder groups.2 43 DSD plan-
ners would undertake a careful implementation process, possibly including
discussion of factors leading to parties' perceptions of procedural fairness, see infra notes 262-264
and accompanying text.
238. The facilitator might be an internal specialist, such as a court ADR administrator, or an
external consultant. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 232, at 73-76.
239. Experts recommend engaging stakeholders in planning court-connected ADR processes.
In addition to stakeholders listed in the text, they recommend involving ADR provider organiza-
tions, policymakers, representatives of academic institutions such as law schools, and media repre-
sentatives. PLAPINGER ET AL., supra note 229, at 41, at 9; Melinda Ostermeyer, Designing Dispute
Resolution Systems: Key Issues and Decisions for Creating or Enhancing Mediation Programs
(2000) (on file with the author) (manuscript at 9).
The public clearly has an interest in court-connected mediation programs. Judges and court
administrators represent public interests to some extent. Public officials have their own institu-
tional interests, and thus some programs may want to use other individuals to represent the inter-
ests of the public in a DSD process.
240. To consider possible harmonization of local procedures with those in other relevant ju-
risdictions, the DSD process could involve consultations with attorneys with multistate practices
who would be sensitive to important local variations, see Robel, supra note 224, at 905, and with
rulemaking authorities in neighboring jurisdictions, see William D. Underwood, Divergence in the
Age of Cost and Delay Reduction: The Texas Experience with Federal Civil Justice Reformi, 25 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 261, 331-32 (1994). It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the range of
strategies that central and local authorities could use to address the legitimate concerns of advo-
cates of uniform rules.
241. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 232, at 96-111
242. See id. at 117-33. For examples of issues to be decided in planning court-connected
mediation programs, see supra note 229 and accompanying text. If a DSD process results in a
consensus for adoption or amendment of local court rules, the court would follow the normal
notice and comment procedure. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1) (procedure for adopting local
rules in federal courts). If program planners conduct a DSD process well, they will consider and
address most stakeholder concerns in proposed rules and thus minimize opposition.
243. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 232, at 134-49.
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an initial pilot program to test and refine the policies before implementing
them indefinitely.244 A DSD plan would provide for periodic evaluation and
refinement of the policies.245 Although using a DSD process requires some
resources, especially at the outset, the amount of judicial resources required
could be fairly limited.246
When considering problems of perceived bad faith in their mediation
programs, courts should constitute ongoing oversight committees to serve
the functions of a design team described above and review issues in the oper-
ation of the programs, including perceived bad faith.247 Mediation programs
are likely to differ in their operational problems and thus may need some-
what different policies. For example, some programs may not experience a
serious problem of inappropriate conduct in mediation. Even in programs
that do experience a significant number of such problems, different policies
may be appropriate for various programs.
As an example, key stakeholders may believe that some people do not
participate in mediations as productively as possible because the mediations
are scheduled at times that the participants believe to be inappropriate.2 48
Programs can use a DSD process to develop a policy about when to set cases
for mediation. Some argue that courts generally should refer cases early in
litigation to minimize litigation time and expense. Others argue that media-
tion should take place relatively late so that litigants can make informed
decisions based on full discovery. Still others favor an approach based on a
244. See id. at 150-67.
245. See id. at 168-86.
246. An effective DSD process requires some time from a few court representatives as well as
other program stakeholders. After the necessary authorities approve and implement a plan, meet-
ings to monitor the program will require a limited amount of time. The program may incur some
cost in hiring someone to facilitate the process if it cannot recruit a suitable volunteer. If a pro-
gram includes empirical evaluation or other research, there may be some associated cost depending
on how such research is structured. The Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State
Courts may provide technical assistance in designing and evaluating procedures. See 28 U.S.C.§ 620(b) (2001) (authorizing stimulation of research as well as training for federal judicial branch
personnel); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS IDENTIFY AND SOLVE
PROBLEMS (2001), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/Consulting/index.htm (last visited Dec.
21, 2001). Program planners also may get assistance from various government or judicial agencies,
academics, and private consultants.
247. Child protection mediation programs routinely use a standing planning and oversight
committee. See JOHN LANDE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, INSTITUTE FOR COURT
MANAGEMENT, CHILD PROTECTION MEDIATION, (2000), available at http://www.ncsc.dni.us/ICM/
distance/Juvenile-familyjustice/2000_12/index.html (last visited June 10, 2001). Such commit-
tees are particularly important in child protection mediation programs because of the large number
of diverse stakeholder groups affected. Other mediation programs also face a wide range of issues
and could benefit from such a committee. See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for
the Delivery of ADR Services by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL.
715, 805-07 (1999).
248. See, e.g., Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26-27) (describing resistance of Onta-
rio attorneys to early referral of cases to mediation).
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case-by-case assessment of the earliest time that litigants can evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of their case. 249 Although policy X theoretically
might be optimal, if the prevailing norms in a practice community favor
policy Y, program administrators can expect resistance to policy X as long as
the local norms favor another approach.250 Program planners can use a DSD
process to identify the norms of various local stakeholder groups, consider
the likely effects of various policy options given those norms, and then make
and implement decisions accordingly.
Just as mediation is no panacea for solving all the problems of litigation,
using DSD techniques does not guarantee optimal mediation policies. Initi-
ating change in any institution is difficult. Court innovation is likely to be
successful only with strong support from judges and an ability to overcome
barriers to change.25 1 A major barrier to change is the opposition of key
stakeholder groups that fear that changes would threaten their values and
interests.25 2 Although programs may not be able to avoid resistance by all
stakeholders, policymakers should anticipate and minimize legitimate resis-
tance to planned policies.25 3 Professor Craig McEwen and his colleagues
found, for example, that Maine divorce attorneys initially resisted a
mandatory divorce mediation program but became enthusiastic supporters as
they appreciated how it fit with their values and served their interests.
254
Part II.B briefly analyzes the interests of key stakeholders of court-con-
nected mediation programs. Part II.C describes specific policy options that
249. See Guthrie & Levin, supra note 12, at 905-06; Lawyering and Mediation Transformation,
supra note 6, at 886.
250. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
251. See Somerlot & Mahoney, supra note 225, at 61-62 (finding that reform efforts were
more successful in California state courts than in federal courts under the CJRA because of differ-
ences in level of judicial leadership, staff involvement, clarity of standards and goals, use of educa-
tion and training during program design and implementation, and continuing communication with
advisory groups). The RAND researchers provide a detailed and thoughtful catalog of impedi-
ments to changing courts, including confusion about goals, organizational dynamics, difficulties in
policy implementation, and local legal culture. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE RE.
FORM ACT 33-37 (1996). These researchers also describe strategies for facilitating change, notably
"'action learning,' a process in which change implementers and recipients try out new behaviors,
processes, and strategies; assess them; and make modifications necessary to move in a desired direc-
tion." Id. at 39 (citation omitted). For techniques to overcome resistance to new dispute proce-
dures generally, see COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 232, at 199-217.
252. One can anticipate opposition from traditionalists, for example, who favor centralized
decisionmaking by judges and experts with limited input from users of the legal system. See Mul-
lenix, supra note 217, at 396-407.
253. See Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at 27) (finding that the court's success in
eliciting attorneys' cooperation with mediation orders in Ottawa was related to the court's flexibil-
ity in implementing the orders to fit the attorneys' needs). See generally Lande, supra note 12, at
218-27 (offering advice and cautions about maintaining support for mediation).
254. Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management of Divorce Practice, 28
LAW & Soc'y REV. 149, 156-63 (1994).
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are consistent with those interests and are thus more likely to be effective in
promoting productive behavior in mediation than a good-faith requirement.
B. Addressing Interests of Mediation Programs' Stakeholders
To minimize problematic behavior and elicit optimal results from court-
connected mediation programs, program planners must have a good under-
standing of stakeholders' interests. Based on empirical research and practical
experience, this part sketches general interests of four key stakeholder
groups: parties, attorneys, courts, and mediators.255 Programs using a systems
design process may consider these generalized interests and/or conduct their
own inquiries about stakeholders' interests in their own particular
communities.
1. Parties' Interests
Professors Chris Guthrie and James Levin summarize research on par-
ties' satisfaction with mediation.256 In general, Guthrie and Levin find that
parties' satisfaction is related to three categories of factors: (1) parties' expec-
tations, (2) characteristics of the process, and (3) case outcomes. Parties are
more likely to feel satisfied if their actual mediation experience meets or
exceeds their expectations.2 57 Parties are more likely to feel satisfied with
mediation when they feel that they have opportunities for meaningful self-
expression and participation in determining the outcome. Parties also are
more satisfied when they believe that the mediation process is fair,258 under-
standable, informative, attentive to their interests, impartial, uncoerced, and
private. 25 9 Regarding outcomes, parties are generally more satisfied when
they settle their cases in mediation260 and when they believe that they saved
255. This part describes stakeholders' interests in mediation generally and does not focus spe-
cifically on bad-faith behavior in mediation. Generally, if mediation programs satisfy stakeholders'
interests, mediation participants are less likely to act inappropriately. See supra note 234 and ac-
companying text. Professor Lisa B. Bingham advocates using DSD processes to plan court-con-
nected dispute resolution programs and proposes a research agenda to assist in these design
processes. See Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on
Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 101, 119-26.
256. See Guthrie & Levin, supra note 12, at 887-97. Note that parties' interests and their
attorneys' interests often overlap, as described infra Part II.B.2.
257. Id. at 888-89.
258. Id. at 892-93. In addition, "perceptions of fairness promote compliance with mediation
agreements; compliance, in turn, may increase the likelihood of party satisfaction with the pro-
cess." Id. at 893 (footnote omitted).
259. Id. at 893-94.
260. Id. at 895. "Although it is true that parties who fail to settle report surprisingly high
levels of satisfaction with mediation, those who do reach agreement tend to rate mediation more
favorably than those who do not." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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money, time, or emotional distress that they otherwise would have
incurred.61
Parties' interest in procedural fairness is related to, but also somewhat
independent of, their satisfaction with mediation. Parties not only want sat-
isfaction and resolution (of course, on favorable terms), but they want to feel
that the process is fair. Professor Nancy Welsh analyzes "procedural justice"
theory and research and identifies the following four factors that promote
parties' experience of procedural fairness:
First, perceptions of procedural justice are enhanced to the extent
that disputants perceive that they had the opportunity to present
their views, concerns, and evidence to a third party and had control
over this presentation ("opportunity for voice"). Second, disputants
are more likely to perceive procedural justice if they perceive that the
third party considered their views, concerns, and evidence. Third,
disputants' judgments about procedural justice are affected by the per-
ception that the third party treated them in a dignified, respectful
manner and that the procedure itself was dignified. Although it
seems that a disputants' [sic] perceptions regarding a fourth factor-
the impartiality of the third party decision maker-also ought to af-
fect procedural justice judgments, it appears that disputants are influ-
enced more strongly by their observations regarding the third party's
even-handedness and attempts at fairness.
262
Applying these findings to contemporary practice in court-connected media-
tion, Welsh argues that mediation may or may not promote perceived proce-
dural fairness depending on how it is implemented. For example, having
attorneys speak for parties would contribute to parties' desire for self-expres-
sion, but only if the attorneys truly understand and express what their clients
want to say.263 Similarly, parties may feel that the process is fair if mediators
express opinions about the merits of the case, but only if the mediators do it
in an even-handed way, so that parties feel that they have been able to tell
their stories and the mediators have listened respectfully.264
261. Id. at 896-97.
262. Welsh, supra note 237, at 820-21 (footnotes omitted); see also Wissler, supra note 11, at
681-89 (summarizing research regarding perceptions of fairness in mediation).
263. Welsh, supra note 237, at 857.
264. id.; see also Roselle L. Wissler, To Evaluate or Facilitate? Parties' Perceptions of Mediation
Affected by Mediator Style, Disp. RESOL. MAo., Winter 2001, at 35 (reporting results of four studies
finding that when mediators evaluated the merits of the case, parties were more likely to believe
that the process was fair and that the mediator understood their views); supra notes 205-206 and
accompanying text (describing parties' experience of settlement pressure based on mediators' evalu-
ation of the merits of a case and recommendations). Although evaluations given by mediators can
be appropriate and helpful, in my view, they also can be problematic. See Lande, supra note 198, at
325-27.
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This research suggests characteristics that mediation program planners
can try to incorporate in their programs to address parties' interests; such an
incorporation, in turn, may reduce the motivation for some problematic
conduct. In particular, programs may promote productive participation by
encouraging (1) pre-mediation consultation between attorneys and clients
and (2) opportunities for participants to express their concerns during medi-
ation without feeling disrespected or pressured to settle by the mediator.265
2. Attorneys' Interests
Empirical research and clinical experience identify what lawyers gener-
ally want from mediation. 66 Lawyers often value mediation because they
believe that it can reduce the time and expense of litigation.267 Lawyers
typically use mediation when they want help in settling a case. In particular,
they often want help analyzing the facts and the law, and they value
mediators' opinions about these matters.268 A study of attorneys' opinions
265. See infra Part lI.C for specific policy options to address parties' interests and promote
appropriate conduct in mediation.
266. Based on interviews with Ontario litigators, Macfarlane created a typology of five ge-
neric types of litigators based on their attitudes about mediation: (1) pragmatist (generally positive
about mediation, seeing it as a useful opportunity for exploring settlement in many cases), (2) true
believer (has made a strong personal commitment to the usefulness of mediation), (3) instrumen-
talist (regards mediation as a process to be used to advance clients' adversarial goals), (4) dismisser
(regards mediation as a fad that differs little from the traditional model of negotiation), and (5)
oppositionist (vocal about the dangers of mediation as an alternative to adjudication). She notes
that respondents often had a combination of these attitudes about mediation. Macfarlane, supra
note 2 (manuscript at 13-24). Macfarlane's study does not provide estimates of the distribution of
these five types, but the data presented in the rest of this part suggests that most lawyers have a
pragmatic attitude about mediation.
267. Many lawyers and parties believe that mediation saves time and money in litigation. See
Lande, supra note 12, at 184-86 (presenting data and summarizing research showing perceived
time and cost savings). A survey of Missouri lawyers found that 85 percent of attorneys chose
mediation because they believed that it saved litigation expense and that 76 percent chose media-
tion because they believed that it accelerated settlement. Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The
Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule
17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). A survey of Minnesota
attorneys produced similar findings, with 68 percent choosing mediation to save litigation expenses
and 57 percent to increase the likelihood of settlement. See Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minne-
sota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L.
REV. 401, 428-29 (2002).
268. In four federal court-connected mediation programs studied by the RAND Institute for
Civil Justice, 60 percent of attorneys who answered a question about whether mediators gave eval-
uations of the case to each side said that mediators did so. Of those attorneys, 70 percent said that
this was helpful, compared with only 7 percent who said that it was detrimental. KAKALIK ET AL.,
supra note 224, at 368 (percentages based on number of valid responses). The survey of Missouri
lawyers found that more than two-thirds of attorneys chose mediation because it helped everyone
value the case and provided a needed reality check for their client or the opposing party or counsel.
McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 267. In selecting a mediator, 87 percent of attorneys said that
they want a mediator who knows how to value a case, 83 percent said that the mediator should be a
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about judicial settlement conferences found that "[1]awyers want judges to
make settlement conferences exercises in reasoning. '' 269 The techniques that
attorneys found most effective were pointing out evidence or law that attor-
neys misunderstand or overlook, privately suggesting to attorneys what con-
cessions their clients should consider making, and telling attorneys the
dollar ranges of reasonable settlements.270 Although the study found that
lawyers want helpful analysis of their cases, it also found that "[llawyers rebel
against judicial approaches to settlement that are dominated by emotion or
exercises of power."'271
McEwen and his colleagues provide an insightful analysis of why Maine
divorce lawyers came to value divorce mediation.272 Going beyond the spe-
cific techniques that lawyers seek in mediation, this analysis considers
deeper goals that mediation fulfills for lawyers. McEwen found that media-
tion helped attorneys reconcile the following dilemmas:
[H]ow to pursue both negotiation and trial preparation; how to en-
courage client participation in case preparation while retaining one's
professional authority; how to provide clients with legal advice while
addressing vitally important non-legal issues; and how to structure
and manage cases so that they can be moved predictably and
expeditiously. 273
These findings are consistent with the results of my survey of business
lawyers, which suggests that they generally believe in mediation because it
helps them solve difficult problems that they encounter in litigation.274 Liti-
gation creates tensions not only with opposing parties and counsel, but also
between lawyers and their own clients. When parties are organizations, law-
litigator, 74 percent said that the mediator should know how to help parties clarify issues, and 69
percent said that the mediator should have substantive experience in the field of law. Id. at 51.
The survey of Minnesota attorneys produced similar findings. See McAdoo, supra note 267, at 429,
433-35. A study of attorneys in four states regarding judicial settlement conferences reported simi-
lar results. The factor most frequently cited as facilitating settlement was willingness to express an
opinion or offer an analysis. WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A
HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JuDGEs 391, 398-402 (1988).
269. BRAZIL, supra note 268, at 392. Although settlement conferences and mediation differ
somewhat in procedures and personnel, attorneys are likely to have similar interests in getting help
from both procedures. The fact that attorneys may have similar interests in getting assistance in
mediation and judicial settlement conferences does not, however, mean that good-faith require-
ments are equally appropriate in both procedures. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
270. BRAZIL, supra note 268, at 407.
271. Id. at 392.
272. See generally McEwen et al., supra note 254. Although this study focuses on divorce
mediation, its findings are relevant to mediation in a wide range of cases involving attorneys.
273. Id. at 150.
274. See Lande, supra note 12, at 201-17.
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yers may need to deal with a large number of individuals.275 My survey indi-
cates that lawyers' belief that mediation is often appropriate is related to the
lawyers' ability to manage the various relationships involved in litigation.276
Taken together, these findings indicate that lawyers generally want me-
diation when they believe that it helps them do their job and satisfy their
clients' interests.277 In a legal culture with the prevailing norm of positional
negotiation, lawyers often value private, neutral, and uncoercive evaluations
to help them and their clients harmonize expectations and rationalize con-
cessions. Lawyers generally appreciate mediation as an appropriate, effi-
cient, and civilized way to resolve troubling disputes, as long as it honors
their roles and their clients' interests.
Sometimes lawyers behave badly. 278 Given the adversarial approach
that many lawyers generally use, mediation program planners can anticipate
that some lawyers will bring that approach into mediation and try to use it
to gain partisan advantage.79 In recent decades, lawyers have used any
available litigation procedure to pressure the other side into a favorable set-
tlement.280 These "Rambo tactics" include motions to disqualify attorneys
for conflicts of interest, disingenuous games with discovery and motion prac-
tice, and use of lawsuits as a strategy to intimidate the other side.281 Virtu-
275. For an excellent discussion of the various relationships involved in litigation, see ROB,
ERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND
DISPUTES 204-23 (2000).
276. This belief in mediation is particularly related to the views that: (1) Mediation helps
preserve business relationships, (2) top executives are satisfied with the results of litigation when
mediation is used, (3) the people to whom the lawyers answer believe that mediation is often
appropriate, (4) mediators often consider business needs and practices, (5) mediation often pro-
duces satisfactory process and results, (6) cases using mediation often settle in an appropriate
amount of time and at an appropriate cost, and (7) businesses would be worse off using the courts
even if ADR takes as much time and money as the courts. Lande, supra note 12, at 203-08.
277. Interviewing commercial litigators who used mediation, Macfarlane found that the
,most consistently articulated outcome goal was the achievement of a business solution that would
offer a commercially viable end to the dispute, without the accumulation of excessive legal fees."
Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at 33).
278. Sometimes parties also behave badly in mediation and display some of the same behav-
iors (or cause their lawyers to display the behaviors) described in this part.
279. Macfarlane found that lawyers' adversarial tactics were a function of local mediation
culture, occurring more often in Toronto than in Ottawa. Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at
19-22, 91-94). See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text.
280. Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Profes-
sion and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 943 (1993); see generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVER-
SARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).
281. Garth, supra note 280, at 939-45; Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of
Judges' and Lawyers' Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 818-23,
828-32 (1998) (documenting lawyers' and judges' descriptions of hardball tactics as the norm in
major civil litigation). Wayne Brazil describes "traditional litigation behaviors" as including:
self-conscious posturing, feigning emotions (even anger) or states of mind, pressing argu-
ments known or suspected to be specious, concealing significant information, obscuring
weaknesses, attempting to divert the attention of other parties away from the main analyti-
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ally every aspect of a case can be disputed. Even rules to protect against
frivolous actions can be used as offensive weapons in adversarial combat.282
Cameron Stracher's memoir of his work at a large New York City law firm
describes how such tactics were standard operating procedures23 and sug-
gests that the practical test for good faith in that context is whether one can
make an argument without laughing.284
When legal culture and economic incentives strongly support rough ad-
versarial tactics, policymakers should not expect that these tactics can be
completely disarmed in mediation, with or without a good-faith require-
ment. Well-implemented mediation programs may help dampen use of such
tactics, especially when the tactics are based on attorneys' cultural assump-
tions about appropriate advocacy techniques as opposed to truly malicious
efforts to harm opponents. Mediation programs are likely to promote pro-
ductive behavior if they provide mediation when participants are ready to
mediate seriously and if the mediation techniques address the participants'
interests.
3. Courts' Interests
Courts have several different interests in court-connected mediation
programs. Many judges see themselves as case managers in addition to adju-
dicators.285 Courts promote negotiation and settlement in the belief that,
overall, settlement saves time and money and produces better results than
cal or evidentiary chance, misleading others about the existence or persuasive power of
evidence not yet formally presented (e.g., projected testimony from percipient or expert
witnesses), resisting well-made suggestions, intentionally injecting hostility or friction into
the process, remaining rigidly attached to positions not sincerely held, delaying other par-
ties' access to information, or needlessly protracting the proceedings-simply to gain time,
or to wear down the other parties or to increase their cost burdens.
Brazil, supra note 10, at 29.
282. Garth, supra note 280, at 949 ("Adversarial lawyers can run up the costs, generate delays
and multiply the pressures to settle by, for example, charging the other side with a frivolous filing
or motion."); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse
at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON Disc. RESOL.
297, 321 (1996). For discussion of abuse of Rule 11, see supra notes 156-166 and accompanying
text.
283. See generally CAMERON STRATCHER, DOUBLE BILLING: A YOUNG LAWYER'S TALE OF
GREED, SEX, LIES, AND THE PURSUIT OF A SWIVEL CHAIR (1998).
284. Id. at 163.
285. See Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICA-
TURE 256, 262 (1986). Some commentators have criticized the increasing managerial role of
judges. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article
III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1032 (2000) (expressing concern about the "transformation of the role
of trial judge into that of manager and settler, of the transformation of courthouses into office
buildings, and of the transformation of the Third Branch into an administrative agency"). See
generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
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trial.286 Courts value mediation as a method of screening out cases that do
not need much judicial attention so that they can focus their limited re-
sources on cases that need more.2 7 Indeed, courts generally see settlement
as an absolute necessity to process all their cases, and judges often look to
mediation as a way to relieve caseload pressures. 288
Courts have a strong interest in assuring the integrity of court-ordered
mediation.289 Courts want to ensure that mediation meets minimal quality
standards and does not unfairly harm litigants.290 Some courts apply good-
faith requirements to achieve those results.291
Courts want to make sure that mediation does not interfere with their
mission of promoting truth and justice in litigation. In adjudicated cases,
courts generally want to admit all relevant evidence permitted by the evi-
dence rules. There is an inherent tension between a general rule favoring
admissibility of evidence and rules establishing testimonial privileges. Legis-
latures and courts must weigh the public interest in the protected activity
(in this case, mediation) against the general need for evidence at trial.29z
286. Galanter, supra note 285, at 258-62.
287. The prefatory note of the Uniform Mediation Act states:
Public policy strongly supports [expansion of mediation in many settings]. Mediation
fosters the early resolution of disputes. The mediator assists the parties in negotiating a
settlement that is specifically tailored to their needs and interests. The parties' participa-
tion in the process and control over the result contributes to greater satisfaction on their
part. Increased use of mediation also diminishes the unnecessary expenditure of personal
and institutional resources for conflict resolution, and promotes a more civil society. For
this reason, hundreds of state statutes establish mediation programs in a wide variety of
contexts and encourage their use.
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note (2001) (citations omitted).
288. Sometimes caseload pressures cause judges to feel desperate about the need to settle
cases. See Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 47 (1987) (expressing strong need to settle at least 350
cases in order to process 400 cases on the typical court's docket).
289. See Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 928 (Ct.
App. 2000), affd on other grounds, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (2001) (stating that the Legislature did
not intend to allow parties to "intentionally thwart[ ] the process" and that good-faith participation
is essential to make mediation work).
290. See generally NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 223, at 152-64 (offering recommendations for
fair and effective ADR programs to operate with integrity).
291. In a major recent case, for example, the court was concerned with controlling improper
litigation tactics of a defendant who failed to bring experts to a mediation as directed, with the
alleged purposes of "derailing" the mediation, re-opening discovery, and bringing a summary judg-
ment motion. The plaintiff had complied with the directive, bringing nine experts to the media-
tion, and incurred more than $30,000 in fees related to the mediation. Foxgate, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 645-49.
292. Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171-81
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that encouraging mediation by adopting a federal mediation privilege
provides "a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational
means for ascertaining the truth" (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996))). Although
authorities struggle with the exact contours of confidentiality protection for mediation, most agree
on the need for a broad confidentiality protection subject to limited exceptions. See UNIF. MEDIA-
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For courts to operate effectively, they need to maintain respect for their
authority and ensure compliance with their orders.2 93 To achieve these
goals, courts generally do not issue orders that they cannot enforce
readily.294
Some of the courts' interests in mediation may conflict with each other.
This particularly arises in connection with a good-faith requirement, given
that analysts disagree about expected consequences of the requirement.
How much does a good-faith requirement stimulate high-quality decision-
making in mediation and how much does it unintentionally stimulate adver-
sarial behavior? How much does it reduce demands on judicial resources by
causing additional settlements, and how much does it add to judicial work
load by requiring adjudication about the good-faith requirement? How
much does it enhance public confidence in the quality of mediation and
how much does it undermine it? How much does it protect mediation confi-
dentiality and how much does it erode it? How easy or difficult is it to
interpret and enforce a good-faith requirement? Commentators vigorously
dispute all of these issues. There is little or no empirical evidence to resolve
these disputes. By contrast, the alternative policies suggested in Part IL.C
offer the prospect of unambiguously addressing courts' interests in mediation
programs.
4. Mediators' Interests
Mediators also have multiple interests in the operation of court-con-
nected mediation programs. Mediators want to provide satisfying services
for mediation participants. This goal is inherent in the mediation ethos of
party self-determination. 29s
Mediators generally want a regular and increasing flow of cases to medi-
ate. Professional mediators want mediation cases to serve their economic
TION AcT § 2(1) prefatory note 1 (2001) (noting that virtually all states have statutes protecting
mediation confidentiality subject to limited exceptions). For discussion of confidentiality protec-
tions in mediation, see supra Part I.C.5.
293. See, e.g., Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 594-95 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
challenge to court's authority to sanction bad faith in mediation, ruling that court had authority
under federal rules, local court rules, mediation referral order, and court's inherent powers). In
addition to legal challenges to their authority, courts respond to disrespect of their authority. See,
e.g., Nick, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1064 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (rejecting suggestion that sanctions were
imposed because of the court's "misplaced temper tantrum"), affd 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001).
294. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 366 (1981) (declaring that courts
will not specifically enforce a promise if the burden of enforcement or supervision is disproportion-
ate to the benefit of enforcement or harm suffered from denial).
295. See supra note 1. Mediators who use evaluative techniques (which some critics argue
undermine self-determination) do so because they believe that they provide services that partici-
pants really want. See generally Lawyering and Mediation Transformation, supra note 6, at 857-79.
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interests and maintain identities as successful mediators. Volunteer
mediators typically enter the field to gain personal satisfaction from mediat-
ing well, and some want mediation experience to develop their careers.
Thus, professional and volunteer mediators are often keenly sensitive about
program features that would affect their future mediation opportunities.
Mediators want mediation procedures to be consistent with their pro-
fessional ideologies and role conceptions. Mediators disagree about proper
goals and tactics of mediation 296 and even about whether there should be a
uniform authoritative conception of mediation or a variety of diverse legiti-
mate approaches.297 Mediators' passionate intensity about both consensus
principlesz9 and contested issues indicates the significance to mediators of
their philosophies of mediation.
Although mediators want people to participate sincerely in mediation,
a good-faith requirement threatens all mediators' interests described above.
Support for mediation may decline if participants fear satellite litigation, vi-
olation of expectations of confidentiality, and potential sanctions. Individ-
ual mediators may fear losing business if they develop a reputation for
reporting allegations of bad faith. Mediators who are pressed to report bad
faith or testify about it also are likely to feel serious role conflicts, given that
this would violate widely shared norms of confidentiality and impartiality.
Moreover, it would cast mediators in an adversarial role against people they
intend to serve and, ironically, make it more difficult to gain participants'
cooperation in some cases. By contrast, the proposals in the following part
are highly consistent with mediators' interests.
C. Policy Options to Address Stakeholders' Interests
and Promote Good Faith in Mediation
In keeping with the spirit of a dispute system design approach, this part
identifies promising policy options for promoting productive conduct but
does not definitely recommend adoption of any of them. Some courts and
mediation programs might find that some of these options would suit their
situations, but other courts and programs might not. These options are al-
ternatives to policies advocated by courts and commentators under the
good-faith rubric. These options are intended to address the interests under-
lying good-faith requirements and avoid the problems of those require-
296. Id. at 849-53 (describing debates about the primacy of empowerment or settlement as a
goal for mediation and the appropriateness of explicit expression of mediator evaluations).
297. Id. at 854-57 (describing the division between "single-school" and "pluralist" definitions
of mediation).
298. For a summary of widely shared principles of mediation, see supra note I.
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ments.299 In considering these options, local policymakers should evaluate
the likely effects (including unintended consequences), incentives created,
and costs imposed in their particular settings.
1. Collaborative Education About Good Practice in Mediation
As Kovach suggests, education is a key element of promoting produc-
tive conduct in mediation. She advocates education both in individual
cases and in general public and professional education efforts.300 Whatever
policies courts adopt to promote mediation, a good educational process can
help in implementing them effectively. At the outset, this may involve dis-
semination of information by mediators and other dispute resolution experts
because many judges, lawyers, and parties may be unfamiliar with mediation
concepts, practices, and values. Over time, the education should be an in-
teractive process in which mediation program planners learn about the
needs and interests of the programs' stakeholders in addition to providing
information and advice.30i This two-way educational process is important
because program outcomes depend on how participants use the program and
how they choose among the various mediation goals and styles. 302 Thus, a
good educational process should be a collaborative dialogue between media-
tion program planners and stakeholders.303
The same spirit of collaborative education should apply during media-
tions themselves. At the outset of a mediation, mediators can inform par-
ticipants of an expectation that they will act appropriately, explain what
that entails, and request them to mediate sincerely. 304 Although Kovach's
definition of good faith is problematic as the basis of a legal requirement, 35
299. This part describes policy options to promote stakeholders' interests in mediation gener-
ally and is not limited to addressing specific unproductive behavior. If mediation programs satisfy
stakeholders' interests generally, mediation participants are less likely to act inappropriately. See
supra note 234 and accompanying text.
300. Kovach, supra note 4, at 619-20.
301. This would be what Everett Rogers calls a process of "convergence" (or decentralized
diffusion) as opposed to a one-way, linear process of communication, as in lectures by experts.
Decentralized diffusion of innovations tend to be focused on solving the problems of local users
who tailor innovations to fit their needs. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 6,
364-69 (4th ed. 1995).
302. From this perspective, mediation is not a determinate and standardized intervention that
should always produce the same results as if flipping a light switch. See Craig A. McEwen, Manag-
ing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the Effective Use of Mediation for Reducing the Cost and
Time of Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 3 (1998) (arguing, in response to debates
about the effectiveness of mediation, that "[i]nstead of asking whether mediation works or not, we
need to examine how and why parties and lawyers 'work' mediation in varying ways").
303. This kind of educational process is entailed in the planning, evaluation, and refinement
stages of dispute systems design processes described in supra Part II.A.2.
304. Kovach, supra note 4, at 596-97.
305. See supra note 25.
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it is a good starting point for discussion with participants about appropriate
conduct in mediation. This discussion may work best if it is in the form of a
dialogue in which participants as well as mediators express their procedural
preferences.
Educational interventions can also be an important remedy for partici-
pants' problematic behavior.30 6 If participants act uncooperatively, media-
tion texts typically prescribe that mediators consult with them in a caucus. 30 7
In these situations, mediators may describe their concerns about the behav-
ior and ask participants whether it is likely to advance their interests. When
mediators conclude that the participants are actually acting in bad faith,308
the mediators typically encourage the participants to change their behavior.
After such an educational process, if the participants persist in inappropriate
behavior, mediators' ethical duties require them to terminate the mediation
without violating the confidentiality obligation.30 9 In most cases, termina-
tion of the mediation should be a sufficient remedy for the problem.
306. The Standards of Practice of the Oregon Mediation Association prescribe education as a
method for handling bad-faith behavior, both at the outset of mediation and when a participant
arguably behaves in bad faith. See OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE,
FINAL DRAFT STANDARD VI, at http://www.mediate.com/articles/orstdsd.cfm#bio (June 16, 2000).
Comments to Standard VI state:
1. The mediator must inform participants that it is the obligation of each participant to
participate in good faith. The mediator must also inform the participants of the need
to be realistic in protecting themselves against possible abuse of the mediation process,
since the mediator cannot guarantee that the mediation process will not be abused by
any participant.
2. When a mediator believes that a participant is not participating in good faith, such as
by nondisclosure or lying, the mediator must encourage that participant to alter the
conduct in question. If, after being encouraged to alter the conduct, the participant
does not do so, the mediator must decide whether or not to discontinue the mediation.
a. If, in the mediator's reasonable judgment, the participant's bad faith is so signifi-
cant that the fairness and integrity of mediation cannot be maintained, then the
mediator shall discontinue mediation. If the mediator discontinues mediation
under these circumstances, the mediator shall do so in a manner that does not
violate the obligation of confidentiality.
Id.
307. See, e.g., MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION
123-24 (1996) (recommending a caucus if a party emotionally manipulates another, makes threats,
or has unrealistic expectations).
308. Mediators should not simply assume participants' bad faith because sometimes a partici-
pant has good reason for what initially appears to be inappropriate behavior. Thus, mediators
should inquire about this privately.
309. See SYMPOSIUM ON STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, STANDARD XI, at http://www.afccnet.org/docs/resources-
model mediation.htm (2000) (containing standards developed by symposium with representatives
from more than twenty organizations, including the American Bar Association Section of Dispute
Resolution and Family Law Section). Standard XI states:
A family mediator shall suspend or terminate the mediation process when the mediator
reasonably believes that a participant is unable to effectively participate ....
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In sum, a variety of collaborative educational efforts can address the
interests of all the major stakeholder groups. These efforts could result in
mediation programs and case procedures that reconcile procedural expecta-
tions and reduce costly disputes over allegedly inappropriate conduct. As a
result, participants are likely to understand the process better and act appro-
priately. The proposed educational efforts can promote attorneys' confi-
dence that they can perform their duties consistent with local norms.
Facilitating such an education process is consistent with mediators' values.
These efforts also are likely to lead to greater respect for court-connected
mediation programs and the sponsoring courts.
2. Pre-Mediation Submission of Documents and Consultations
Mediation is likely to be productive when participants are well-pre-
pared for mediation. 310 Participants can prepare by exchanging position pa-
pers and documents before mediation. 311 The position papers at a minimum
might include: "(1) the legal and factual issues in dispute, (2) the party's
position on those issues, (3) the relief sought (including a particularized
itemization of all elements of damage claimed), and (4) any offers and coun-
A. Circumstances under which a mediator should consider suspending or terminating
the mediation, may include, among others: ... 6. a participant is using the media-
tion process to gain an unfair advantage ....
Id. See also OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 306, at Standard VI.2.a (terminating
mediation due to bad faith and preserving confidentiality); SYMPOSIUM ON STANDARDS OF PRAC-
TICE, MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, STANDARD VII
(duty of confidentiality). Some court rules provide that termination of mediation should be the
consequence of bad faith in mediation. See, e.g., 11TH JUD. CIR. (Ill.) CT. R., App. D(j).
310. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 622; Weston, supra note 4, at 628. Participants who pre-
pare for mediations are likely to feel a greater investment in making the process successful. Wissler
found that parties were more likely to settle if they were better prepared by their attorneys. See
Wissler, supra note 11, at 676. When attorneys prepared their clients for mediation, both groups
felt that the process was more fair and the parties were less likely to report feeling pressured by the
mediator. Id. at 687, 698-99.
311. See Sherman, supra note 10, at 2094-96. Some court rules and individual mediators
now require each side to provide such submissions. Some courts require this as an element of a
good-faith requirement and others do so independent of any such requirement. See, e.g.,
E.D.N.C.R. 32.07(0 (requiring all parties to be prepared to discuss, in good faith, liability and
damage issues as well as their position to settlement); Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d
1056, 1061-62 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (requiring a memorandum as an element of good faith), aff d 270
F.3d 590 (8th Cit. 2001). Some court rules require parties to provide a pre-nediation memo to the
other parties and the mediator, a confidential memo solely for the mediator, or both memos. See,
e.g., E.D. WASH. Loc. R. 16.2(c)(2)(b)(3)(C). Macfarlane found that Ontario litigators com-
monly exchange information prior to mediation, especially in Ottawa, where the local culture is
more supportive of mediation. Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26); see also Wissler, supra
note 11, at 645 n.9 (collecting studies reporting that attorneys were required to submit pre-media-
tion memos and/or pleadings).
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teroffers previously made." 312 In addition, these papers could identify every-
one who will attend from each side and identify their roles.313 Programs
could require that the papers include certain additional items of
information. 314
Courts could require each side to submit pre-mediation documents by a
specified time (for example, ten days) before the scheduled mediation date.
The mediator would determine whether the documents satisfy the require-
ment and, if not, would give prompt written notice of the deficiencies. Such
a rule might establish a specified grace period to cure the deficiencies.315
Parties who do not do so within that time could be subject to sanctions.316
The mediator could file a brief report to the court, including the documents
submitted by the alleged offender (if any) and the mediator's notice of defi-
ciencies. Such reports might be somewhat similar to post-mediation reports
filed by mediators that list mediation attendees and indicate whether any
agreements were reached. 317
Establishing a legal requirement for each side to file pre-mediation sub-
missions has at least two potential problems. First, the value of the submis-
312. Sherman, supra note 10, at 2095. In four federal court-connected mediation programs
studied by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 80 percent of attorneys said that mediators re-
quired written pre-mediation submissions. Of those attorneys, 71 percent say that this practice was
helpful, compared with only 1 percent who said that it was detrimental. KAKALIK ET AL., supra
note 224, at 368 (percentages based on number of valid responses).
313. This would address problems arising when people attend without identifying their roles,
or where parties do not plan to bring needed individuals, such as authorized representatives or
experts. See Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 645-46(2001) (noting that plaintiff brought nine experts to mediation and defendant brought no experts);
Kovach, supra note 4, at 594 (describing a case in which a jury consultant attended mediation
pretending to be a party's business consultant). Such a provision would not avoid all such attend-
ance issues, but it would put the participants and the mediator on notice well before the mediation
so that potential problems could be addressed ahead of time.
314. Berkeley, California mediator Ron Kelly has developed an extensive set of questions that
parties can answer in advance regarding such things as their perceptions of their own interests and
the others' interests, perceptions of the facts, feelings about trust and betrayal, evidence that might
affect the other side's perceptions, alternatives to a negotiated agreement, and ways that the media-
tor might be able to help. RON KELLY, KEY QUESTIONS BEFORE YOU MEET, at http://
www.ronkelly.com/RonKellyTools.html#KeyQuestions (1997). Participants, mediators, and medi-
ation programs might use some or all items on this checklist.
315. This would be similar to a provision under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for curing deficiencies of documents filed in court. See supra note 164. Weston's good-faith
proposal also incorporates a similar principle. See Weston, supra note 4, at 631-32.
316. In this situation, the mediation presumably would be cancelled or rescheduled. Because
the noncompliance would be determined without convening all the participants, the complying
parties would suffer much less cost and inconvenience compared with attending an unproductive
mediation.
317. See, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(a) (requiring that when parties do not reach agreement,
mediators must report to the court the lack of an agreement, without comment or recommenda-
tion). Possible reports about pre-mediation submissions presumably would be strictly limited to
compliance, without any other comment by the mediators.
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sions arguably might be decreased if each side anticipates that the
submissions might be disclosed in court. In that situation, people may be
less candid. This may not be a serious problem, however, if the required
submissions focus on basic objective information. If each side would provide
the information to the opposing parties, participants normally would not
make any damaging admissions. Thus, requiring such an exchange with the
potential of disclosure in a sanctions hearing should not inhibit much can-
dor. Although enforcing a requirement that parties provide confidential
memos to mediators might result in better preparation for mediation, partici-
pants may not be candid if they fear that these memos might be disclosed in
a compliance hearing.
A second problem is potentially more serious. Enforcing a rule ordering
parties to provide pre-mediation submissions might conflict with mediation
confidentiality rules and thus might require an exception or waiver.318 The
UMA articulates the principle favoring confidentiality of mediation, "sub-
ject only to the need for disclosure to accommodate specific and compelling
societal interests. ' 319 An exception for mediator reports about deficiencies
in pre-mediation submissions would be more narrow and objective than an
exception for good-faith violations.30 Nonetheless, reasonable people can
differ about the wisdom of a confidentiality exception for reports about defi-
ciencies of pre-mediation submissions.
Even if a court or mediation program does not require an exchange of
documents before mediations, it certainly can encourage these exchanges.
318. The UMA establishes a privilege relating to a "mediation communication" which is
defined as "a statement ... that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of... initiating,
continuing, or reconvening a mediation." UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 2(2) (2001) (emphasis added).
The UMA Reporter's Notes make clear that this definition would include "mediation 'briefs' pre-
pared by the parties for the mediator." Id. at § 2(2) reporter's note. By contrast, the "mere fact
that a person attended the mediation-in other words, the physical presence of a person-is not a
communication" and thus is not covered by the privilege. Id.
319. Id. at prefatory note.
320. For discussion of confidentiality issues generally, see supra Part.l.C.5.
A requirement of pre-mediation submissions could cause additional related problems. If
mediators send notices of deficiencies, program planners should expect that some people receiving
the notices will call the mediators to discuss what will be needed to cure the problems. If there is a
dispute over the sufficiency of an attempted cure, presumably evidence would be needed about
conversations between the mediator and the alleged offender, possibly including testimony by the
mediator. This would greatly expand the scope of a confidentiality exception and make it much
more problematic.
These additional problems would be avoided if mediators did not report deficiencies and the
parties were responsible for initiating action against allegedly deficient submissions. This would
not solve the basic confidentiality problem, however. Even if the submissions were routinely filed
in court pursuant to a court rule, the submissions still would be considered privileged communica-
tions under the UMA as long as the submissions were oriented to initiating mediation. See supra
note 318.
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Courts and programs can cultivate local practice norms by developing stan-
dardized formats for voluntary exchange of documents.
It also usually is helpful for mediators to consult with participants
before mediation.321 Such consultations can help identify and remedy po-
tential procedural problems.322 These consultations can address issues about
attendance of appropriate representatives and experts so that participants
will not be surprised about this when they arrive at mediation.323 During
such consultations, mediators can help identify information and documents
for participants to bring to make the mediation most productive. Even if
programs do not require exchange of pre-mediation submissions, courts
should authorize payment of mediators' fees for a limited and reasonable
amount of pre-mediation consultation.
Establishing a system for pre-mediation submission of documents and
consultations can address the interests of the major stakeholder groups. This
can help litigants, attorneys, and mediators all be better prepared and have
realistic expectations when they attend mediation. This pre-mediation ac-
tivity can help identify and resolve potential problems in advance and possi-
bly avoid wasted time in mediation and later court hearings. Better
preparation for mediation also can help attorneys and mediators do their
jobs productively and help address the parties' interests with less need to
seek court adjudication. Reconciling the interests of exchanging pre-media-
tion documents with confidentiality rules and norms can be a difficult chal-
lenge. Using a local system design process can help craft particular
arrangements that comply with applicable legal rules and fit well with local
practice norms.
3. Requirement of Mere Attendance
for a Limited and Specified Time
Courts should consider specifying how long participants must remain at
mediation. Currently, attendance requirements usually do not do so. 324
Under Kovach's good-faith proposal, participants would be required to re-
321. Many mediators regularly arrange such consultations. In some cases, mediators consult
each side separately. In other cases, mediators have joint consultations, often through conference
calls with the attorneys. In yet other cases, mediators use both approaches. In addition, opposing
counsel can consult with each other to prepare for a mediation without involving the mediator.
322. For further discussion of possible education efforts to promote high-quality mediation,
see supra Part II.C.1.
323. For discussion of attendance of organizational representatives with appropriate authority,
see infra Part II.C.3.
324. A few court rules do specify a required period of attendance, usually two or three hours.
See, e.g., 21ST Juo. CIR. (Ill.) CT. R. 9.4(a)(5)(i) ("[M]ediation can be suspended or terminated at
the request of either party after two hours of mediation.").
HeinOnline  -- 50 UCLA L. Rev. 132 2002-2003
Designing Court-Connected Mediation Programs 133
main "at the mediation until the mediator determines that the process is at
an end or excuses the parties. '325 This proposed requirement is overbroad
and could lead to abuse. 326
Courts might require participants to attend mediation for a specific
time period, such as one hour.327 This would avoid uncertainty about what
participants are required to do and remove an element of mediators' discre-
tionary authority that could be abused. If participants are required to stay
for a limited period, mediators can encourage them to make the most of that
time, and many people would take advantage of this opportunity. 38 Requir-
ing attendance for a limited, specified time can provide an opportunity to
mediate for those interested in trying mediation while imposing only a lim-
ited cost on those not interested in doing so.
Although attendance at mediation by representatives with authority to
settle the case generally helps make mediation more productive, a require-
ment of attendance with full settlement authority is problematic because it
invites resistance and easy evasion. 329 After the Heileman decision,330 Rule
16 was amended to state: "If appropriate, the court may require that a party
or its representatives be present or reasonably available by telephone in or-
der to consider possible settlement of the dispute." 331 In crafting the revised
325. Kovach, supra note 4, at 623.
326. See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
327. A minimal option would require attendance only for the mediator's introduction and
would permit participants to leave after that. This option reflects the interpretation of FLA. MEDIA-
TION R., FLA. MEDIATOR ETHICS ADV. CMTE OPINION 95-009A-B, available at http://
www.flcourts.org/osca/divisions/adr/opinions.htm (last updated May 20, 2002). This is consistent
with ethical guidelines for mediators that state that "[ainy party may withdraw from mediation at
any time." AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ET AL., supra note 1, § I.
Another option would be to allow parties to file a motion to cancel the mediation if they do
not intend to make an offer or increase their last offer. For discussion of this option, see infra Part
11.C.4.
In some cases, mediation is not appropriate and mediation programs rules should identify cases
in which mediation is inappropriate and in which parties should not be required to attend at all.
See, e.g., Jessica Pearson, Mediating When Domestic Violence Is a Factor: Policies and Practices in
Court-Based Divorce Mediation Programs, 14 MEDIATION Q. 319, 325-26 (1997) (describing prac-
tices for screening cases for exclusion from mediation due to domestic violence).
328. Even if participants do not wish to settle at mediation, the time required for attendance
could be used productively to discuss upcoming litigation issues, such as issues discussed in pretrial
conferences. See FED. R. Clv. P. 16(c); Stoehr v. Yost, 765 N.E.2d 684, 688-89 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002).
329. Commenting on an earlier draft, a mediation program administrator suggested that
mediators simply accept assertions of full settlement authority at "face value," stating that this was
the practice in her program and it never presented a problem. In essence, this would mean that
participants would have to justify their positions on grounds other than settlement authority. In
some mediation cultures, this may be an effective policy. In other mediation cultures, however, it
may invite evasion and abuse as described supra in text accompanying notes 130-147.
330. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
For discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 130-136.
331. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
HeinOnline  -- 50 UCLA L. Rev. 133 2002-2003
134 50 UCLA LAw REVIEW 69 (2002)
language, the Advisory Committee wisely did not include a requirement of
"full settlement authority" and instead opted for a more flexible approach
about attendance:
[The revised rule] refers to participation by a party or its representa-
tive. Whether this would be the individual party, an officer of a cor-
porate party, a representative from an insurance carrier, or someone
else would depend on the circumstances. Particularly in litigation in
which governmental agencies or large amounts of money are in-
volved, there may be no one with on-the-spot settlement authority,
and the most that should be expected is access to a person who would
have a major role in submitting a recommendation to the body or
board with ultimate decision-making responsibility. The selection of
the appropriate representative should ordinarily be left to the party
and its counsel. 332
The Advisory Committee acknowledged that courts have the inherent
authority to require personal participation under Heileman but suggested that
courts may be wise to refrain from exercising the full extent of such author-
ity: "[Tlhe unwillingness of a party to be available, even by telephone, for a
settlement conference may be a clear signal that the time and expense in-
volved in pursuing settlement is likely to be unproductive and that personal
participation by the parties should not be required. ' '333
Riskin suggests framing an order to attend a settlement conference as
an invitation. 334 Although participants would be required to attend, his
point is that attendance should be something that the participants would
find inviting. This is similar to Kovach's notions that good-faith participa-
tion might be requested or recommended by mediators and/or courts. 335
There is a subtle and important difference, however. Invitations generally
imply that the invitees would find the subject desirable or else they would
not accept the invitation. Requests and recommendations often imply that
the recipients might find the experience unpleasant.
Based on research on satisfaction with mediation,336 program planners
can design mediation programs that participants would find inviting and
332. Id. at advisory committee notes on 1993 amendments.
333. Id.; see also In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 900, 903-905 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that the
court has inherent power to require attendance of a representative with full settlement authority
but that such power should be used "very sparingly").
334. Riskin, supra note 125, at 1114. Riskin was referring to judicial settlement conferences,
but the logic would be the same for court-ordered mediations. Riskin distinguishes between a
judicial host "[r]aising a [flist or [eixtending a [h]and." Raising a fist refers to pressuring parties to
settle, whereas extending a hand refers to facilitating the parties' education so that they can make
their own settlement decisions. Riskin favors extending a hand. Id. at 1083-85.
335. Kovach, supra note 4, at 596-99. Kovach doubts the effectiveness of requests and rec-
ommendations to mediate in good faith, which is why she proposes a requirement of good faith.
336. See supra Part IIB..1.
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that would minimize the need for court remedies for nonattendance. Al-
though courts may use orders to secure participants' attendance in media-
tion, most are likely to attend quite willingly if the programs fit their needs
and expectations. Even with the best designed program or a stringent good-
faith requirement, some people may decline an invitation to mediate seri-
ously. Program planners face a choice whether to orient their programs to-
ward such people or toward the likely majority who will respond positively
to a well-prepared invitation.3 7 A good systems design process can help
mediation programs tailor their policies to maximize productive attendance.
4. Policy Governing Cancellation of Mediation
If a mediation program is generally well-designed to satisfy participants'
interests, it can avoid some problematic behavior in mediation by develop-
ing a suitable cancellation policy. In some bad-faith cases, the parties had
opportunities to request cancellation of mediation and the courts obviously
were annoyed that they failed to do so.338 Texas Department of Transportation
v. Pirtle339 is a good example. The court sanctioned the defendant because,
knowing that it did not plan to make a settlement offer, it failed to object to
the mediation order as authorized by statute. 340 Parties uninterested in me-
diation may fail to object for at least four possible reasons. First, they may be
unaware of a procedure to object to a mediation referral order. Second, they
may believe that moving to vacate such an order would be unproductive or
counterproductive if they believe that the court would not grant the mo-
tion.341 Third, they may believe that it would be more efficient to invest the
time in a brief mediation than in a motion to vacate a mediation order.342
337. For a discussion of that policy analysis, see infra notes 361-366 and accompanying text.
338. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d 657, 657-58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); see also
Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058 (E.D. Mo. 2000), affd 270 F.3d 590 (8th
Cit. 2001) (noting that, three days before mediation, defense counsel assured the court that the
defendant was prepared to discuss settlement in good faith at mediation, but later failed to do so at
mediation); Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 924 (Ct.
App. 2000) (noting that sanctioned party failed to object to order requiring attendance of that
party's experts), affd on other grounds, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (2001); Stoehr v. Yost, 765 N.E.2d
684, 686-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing defendant's conduct in inducing the plaintiff to mediate
without intending to settle as one of the reasons for the trial court's sanction against the
defendant).
339. Pirtle, 977 S.W. 2d 657. For further description of this case, see supra note 70.
340. Id. at 657-58.
341. In Nick, the defense counsel informed the plaintiffs counsel, but not the court, that he
believed that the mediation would not be fruitful. Nick, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. Defense counsel
may have believed that the court would not have welcomed a motion to vacate the mediation
order.
342. In Toronto, for example, some attorneys prefer to have a "20-minute mediation" than to
move to adjourn the mediation. See Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26-27).
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Fourth, they may be willing to listen to arguments or make partial or proce-
dural agreements even if they expect that the mediation probably would not
result in a complete settlement.
Mediation program planners- face a dilemma in adopting a cancellation
policy. If courts signal that they will cancel mediations easily, they risk that
many appropriate cases will be cancelled. On the other hand, if they rarely
permit cancellation or make it burdensome to cancel mediation, many medi-
ations are likely to be unproductive and produce complaints of bad faith.
An intermediate option would be to permit cancellations based on joint
motions from all sides.343 This policy could be ineffective or counterproduc-
tive, however. If D suggests to P, for example, to move jointly to vacate a
mediation order and P declines to join, the resulting mediation could be
quite acrimonious. In such a mediation, presumably D would be predisposed
not to settle and might additionally blame P for insisting on a wasteful medi-
ation. Given this scenario, P might feel forced to join in D's motion even if
P believed that the mediation could be useful. Considering these likely dy-
namics, a more prudent policy might be to allow cancellations based on the
motion of any party.344
This analysis suggests that no cancellation policy by itself would ensure
that appropriate cases are mediated and that inappropriate cases are excused
from mediation requirements. All of these options, by themselves, could
undermine courts' interests in saving time and money for the litigants and
the courts and in eliciting cooperation with the court management systems.
The solution to this problem entails designing mediation programs to satisfy
participants' interests generally. 345 In that situation, most participants are
not likely to want to cancel mediation. By using a systems design process,
mediation program planners can tailor program procedures, including a can-
cellation policy, to minimize participants' motivation to act inappropriately
in mediation.
343. The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri has adopted such a rule. "If the
parties agree that the referral to ADR has no reasonable chance of being productive, the parties
may jointly move the court for an order vacating the ADR referral prior to the selection of the
neutral." E.D. Mo. Loc. R. 16-6.02(A)(1)(3).
344. Although requiring a joint motion to vacate a mediation referral order may be unwise,
courts and program planners can usefully encourage opposing sides to consult with each other
about whether a scheduled mediation would be productive and, if not, whether it might be produc-
tive at a later time or under different circumstances. Even if courts do not require a joint motion to
vacate a mediation order, a joint motion would often be more influential.
345. See Macfarlane, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26-27) (describing greater resistance to
mediation in Toronto than Ottawa, based in part on degree of flexibility in scheduling mediation
when the attorneys are ready to mediate).
136 50 UCLA LAW REVIEW 69 (2002)
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5. Protections Against Misrepresentation
Existing techniques are available to protect against misrepresentation
in mediation without a good-faith requirement. 346 For example, under the
Uniform Mediation Act, evidence may be admitted to "prove a claim to
rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of
the mediation. ''347 Parties can protect themselves by including representa-
tion or warranty provisions in mediated agreements when they rely on repre-
sentations of material facts or promises. 348  If participants are uncertain
about particular representations, mediators or attorneys can raise the option
of warranty provisions. If particular courts repeatedly have problems with
misrepresentations in mediation, they can recommend that participants con-
sider warranty provisions in each case. Because mediated agreements are
readily admissible in evidence, 349 warranty provisions could avoid most dis-
putes about the content of alleged misrepresentations covered in the war-
ranty provisions.
Another possible protection against misrepresentation would be a brief
cooling-off period before mediated agreements become binding to permit in-
vestigations about any material facts on which the parties relied. Welsh
proposes using a three-day cooling-off period before mediated settlement
agreements become binding as a protective measure against high-pressure
tactics in mediation.350 Although she did not intend this proposal to address
problems of misrepresentation, it could be useful for that purpose as well.
Even where no rule requires a cooling-off period, mediators or attorneys can
suggest including such provisions in mediated agreements when they might
be appropriate. These provisions could include arrangements for exchanges
of documents or assurances as necessary to avoid reliance on questionable
representations made in mediation.
In general, people harmed by relying on misrepresentations are typically
harmed in entering a contract. In those situations, the law provides reme-
346. For discussion of misrepresentation as an element of bad faith, see supra note 25. For
arguments that a good-faith requirement is needed to protect against misrepresentation, see Ko-
vach, supra note 4, at 623; Weston, supra note 4, at 628.
347. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(2) (2001). Agreements reached in mediation are subject
to the same rules of interpretation and enforcement as other agreements. See generally COLE ET AL.,
supra note 170, at § 4:13, at 4-52 to 4-67.
348. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 275, at 289-90.
349. UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 6(a)(1) (2001).
350. Welsh, supra note 17, at 86-92. Cooling-off periods are potentially problematic because
they could be abused. For example, a party might make an agreement in mediation intending to
renege during the cooling-off period as a way to wear down the other side. Nonetheless, mediation
program planners might experiment with them to see how people use them in particular mediation
cultures.
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dies under certain conditions. 351 Proponents of a good-faith requirement
identify two situations in which parties in mediation may be harmed by mis-
representations even when there is no agreement. One situation is the mis-
representation of a jury consultant as a business associate. 352 This problem
can be addressed largely by identifying mediation participants in advance. 353
The second situation arises when one side attends mediation for the
sole purpose of discovery. 354 Exchanging information is an important part of
mediation. 315 Even when mediations do not result in settlement, the discus-
sions may be helpful in narrowing issues and exchanging information. At
root, therefore, the complaint about using mediation solely for discovery is
that the alleged offender has no real intent of settling.356 This complaint
often arises when one side feels that the other side is not making appropriate
offers and the complaining party infers a lack of sincerity. Usually both sides
are willing to settle but do not want to make offers near each other's expec-
tations at that point in the mediation. Sometimes, however, one side does
attend mediation with ulterior motives and no intention of settling.35 In
particular cases in which individuals seem to be asking excessive or inappro-
priate questions, participants can ask about the purpose of the questions and
decline to answer. Participants presumably can withdraw from the media-
tion if unsatisfied with the other side's actions.358 If use of mediation solely
for discovery is a recurrent problem, it probably indicates that the policy-
makers have not designed the mediation program well to fit the local legal
and mediation culture. In this situation, revising the mediation referral pro-
cedures may be a more appropriate policy than frequent imposition of bad-
faith sanctions.
351. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 7, topic 1, introductory note (1981).
352. Kovach, supra note 4, at 594.
353. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
354. Kovach, supra note 4, at 593-94; Weston, supra note 4, at 595.
355. Exchanging information is an element of good faith under Kovach's and Weston's pro-
posals. See Kovach, supra note 4, at 616; Weston, supra note 4, at 628.
356., Weston, supra note 4, at 6. Proponents of a good-faith requirement have no objection
to-and indeed welcome-exchange of information if the parties negotiate sincerely. See supra
text accompanying note 355.
357. Given that the essence of this problem is lack of intent to settle, it turns on a determina-
tion of a participant's state of mind, a factor that the proponents argue is inappropriate for courts to
explore in adjudicating bad-faith claims. See supra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
358. Ironically, a good-faith rule that requires parties to "remain[ ] at the mediation until the
mediator determines that the process is at an end or excuses the parties" could force innocent
participants to endure prolonged mediation sessions while the other side goes on a "fishing expedi-
tion." Kovach, supra note 4, at 623. This Article suggests that participants should be free to leave
mediation after a limited and definite amount of time. See supra Part 1I.C.3. In addition, a media-
tor who believes that a participant is abusing the mediation process can talk privately with the
participant to understand the behavior and, if the mediator concludes that the behavior is inappro-
priate, encourage the participant to change the behavior or terminate the mediation. See supra
notes 306-309 and accompanying text.
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Another protection against misrepresentations relates to potential law-
yer discipline for untruthfulness. 359 Under the Uniform Mediation Act, evi-
dence of mediation communications relating to claims of professional
misconduct is not privileged.36 When mediators or participants believe that
a statement may be a misrepresentation, they may alert the person making
the statement of the risks involved and provide opportunities to correct any
misrepresentations.
Although the measures described in this part might not prevent all
problems of misrepresentation, these policies are likely to deal successfully
with most such problems without additional litigation or exceptions to con-
fidentiality rules. These procedures would be consistent with attorneys' and
mediators' conceptions of their responsibilities to reach sound agreements
that satisfy clients' interests. These policies also would satisfy courts' inter-
ests in maintaining the integrity of mediation programs with relatively little
need for judicial intervention.
CONCLUSION
A good-faith requirement in mediation is very troublesome. Although
it may deter some inappropriate conduct, it also may stimulate even more. It
risks undermining the interests of all the stakeholder groups of court-con-
nected mediation, especially interests in the integrity of the mediation pro-
cess and the courts.
Kovach argues that a good-faith requirement would include "some re-
strictions on the behavior of a few so that the majority of participants will
have positive, meaningful experiences and outcomes. '36' This Article sug-
gests that it would produce precisely the opposite result. Actively enforcing
a good-faith requirement would subject all participants to uncertainty about
the impartiality and confidentiality of the process and could heighten adver-
sarial tensions and inappropriate pressures to settle cases. 362 Although such
a requirement could deter and punish truly egregious behavior in what Ko-
359. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1983) (prohibiting lawyers from making
false statements of material fact or failing to disclose a material fact when necessary to avoid assist-
ing in a criminal or fraudulent act by a client). For an excellent discussion of lawyers' professional
and ethical dilemmas in negotiation and advice for dealing with those dilemmas, see MNOOKIN ET
AL., supra note 275, at 274-94.
360. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(6) (2001) (stating an exception to privilege for mediation
communications related to claims of professional misconduct or malpractice based on conduct oc-
curring during a mediation). See generally Pamela Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil:
The Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality
and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715.
361. Kovach, supra note 4, at 605.
362. Kovach argues that "[a]lthough satellite litigation is not wholly preventable, benefits of
good faith participation in those cases that go to mediation outweigh the detriment of any poten-
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vach describes as a few cases, it would do so at the expense of overall confi-
dence in the system of mediation. Barring evidence of a substantial number
of problems of real bad faith (as opposed to loose litigation talk), 363 the large
cost of a bad-faith sanctions regime is not worth the likely small amount of
benefit, especially considering the alternative policy options available.
Given the serious foreseeable problems of a good-faith requirement, the
burden should be on the proponents to demonstrate that: (1) There is a
serious and recurring problem of clearly defined bad-faith conduct in media-
tion in a local community, (2) the requirement would be effective in deter-
ring such conduct, (3) the benefits of the requirement would outweigh the
problems, and (4) the net benefits of the requirement would exceed the net
benefits of alternative policies such as those suggested in this Article. Most
mediation programs would not satisfy all these conditions, and thus a good-
faith requirement rarely would be justified. 364 Although there apparently
have been no empirical studies of the impact of a good-faith requirement,
the experience with Rule 11 counsels caution.3 65 Using Riskin's metaphor, a
good-faith sanctions regime would "raise a fist" when policymakers first
should consider policies that "extend a hand.."366
A combination of the policies described in Part II.C probably would
induce most mediation participants to act productively. These policies
would help attorneys advance their clients' interests. They would encourage
trust in mediators by avoiding the need for them to testify against partici-
pants. They would avoid the prospect of satellite litigation and satellite me-
diation over accusations of bad faith, which would divert attention from the
merits of the dispute and the parties' real interests. They are consistent with
the norms and spirit of mediation. Court orders incorporating such policies
tial satellite litigation." Id. at 604. Even though satellite litigation would occur in a relatively
small number of cases, the threat of such litigation would hang over mediations generally.
363. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text for discussion of loose litigation talk of
bad faith.
364. Several people who read earlier drafts of this Article wondered why it does not categori-
cally reject the use of a good-faith requirement. There are two reasons. First, there is little or no
empirical evidence of the effects of a good-faith requirement or alternative policies as there is, for
example, about the effects of Rule 11. See supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text. Although
the arguments against a good-faith requirement are compelling, complete confidence is not war-
ranted without suitable empirical evidence. Second, this Article contends that local legal culture
significantly affects the consequences of policies regulating behavior in mediation and that local
decisionmakers should make policies calculated to be effective in their local communities. See
supra notes 219-230, 235-242 and accompanying text. Given this perspective, it would be inap-
propriate to make a universal policy recommendation for all mediation programs. As a practical
matter, policymakers who follow the recommendations in the text usually would reject a good-faith
requirement and choose other policies.
365. See supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 334.
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would be readily enforceable with little uncertainty about what constitutes
compliance.
Courts should invite all stakeholder groups to participate in designing
and implementing mediation program policies that satisfy the interests of all
the stakeholder groups. If the design process results in a general consensus,
the resulting policies are likely to be effective in promoting the integrity of
the mediation programs.
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